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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 78-2-2(j) of the 
Utah Code. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant lists five issues which are restatements of the single issue before the 
Court as set forth below. However, for the Court's convenience, Appellee's brief 
responds to each section and argument raised by the Appellant in corresponding order. 
Issue Presented 
Where a judgment is vacated by the Court of Appeals and later reinstated by the 
Supreme Court, is the priority of the judgment lien established by the date that the 
judgment was reinstated, or does it relate back to the date of the original judgment? 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's factual findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous 
standard, and its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Board ofEduc, v. Ward, 
1999 UT 174 8, 974 P.2d 824; Pennington v. Allstate Ins, Co., 973 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1998). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
78-22-1. Duration of Judgment - Judgment as Lien Upon Real Property -
Abstract of Judgment - Small Claims Judgment not Lien - Appeal of 
Judgment - Child Support Orders [Effective Until July 1, 2002]. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (6), judgments shall continue for eight years 
unless previously satisfied or unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance 
with law. 
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(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by Subsections (4) and (5), the entry of 
judgment by a district court is a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, not 
exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, located 
in the county in which the judgment is entered. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1 (Supp. 2001). 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 36, Issuance of Remittitur, 
(a) Date of issuance. 
(1) In the Supreme Court the remittitur of the court shall issue 15 days after 
the entry of the judgment. If a petition for rehearing is timely filed, the remittitur 
of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order disposing of the 
petition. 
(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue 
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or 
shortened by order of the court. A certified copy of the opinion of the court, any 
direction as to costs, and the record of the proceedings shall constitute the 
remittitur. 
(b) Stay, supersedeas or injunction pending application for review to the 
Supreme Court of the United States. A stay or supersedeas of the remittitur or an 
injunction pending application for review may be granted on motion and for good cause. 
A motion for a stay of the remittitur or for approval of a supersedeas bond or for an order 
suspending, modifying, restoring, or granting an injunction during the pendency of an 
appeal must ordinarily be made in the first instance in the court rendering the decision 
appealed from. A motion for such relief may be made in the reviewing court, but the 
motion shall show that a motion in the court rendering the decision is not practicable, or 
that the court rendering the decision has denied such a motion or has failed to afford the 
relief which the movant requested, with the reasons given by the court rendering the 
decision for its action. Reasonable notice of the motion shall be given to all parties. The 
period of the stay, supersedeas or injunction shall be for such time as ordered by the court 
up to and including the final disposition of the application for review. If the stay, 
supersedeas, or injunction is granted until the final disposition of the application for 
review, the party seeking the review shall, within the time permitted for seeking the 
review, file with the clerk of the court which entered the decision sought to be reviewed, a 
certified copy of the notice of appeal, petition for a writ of certiorari, or other application 
for review, or shall file a certificate that such application for review has been filed. Upon 
the filing of a copy of an order of the reviewing court dismissing the appeal or denying 
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the petition for a writ of certiorari, the remittitur shall issue immediately. A bond or other 
security on such terms as the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to 
the grant or continuance of relief under this paragraph. 
U. R. App. P. 36 (Mitchie 1995) (amended April 1, 2001) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves a dispute over lien priority on real property previously owned 
by Lan England (the "subject property"). Appellant, Principal Funding Corporation 
("PFC") claims to own a judgment previously obtained by Eugene Horbach on a 
counterclaim against England, (the "Horbach Judgment"), in England v. Horbach, Civil 
No. 930901471CV; 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1997). Appellee, MP Ventures, currently owns 
the subject property acquired through a series of conveyances subsequent to the 
foreclosure of a trust deed that secured a loan made to Mr. England. That trust deed was 
recorded after the Horbach Judgment had been vacated by the Court of Appeals and 
before it was reinstated by the Supreme Court. The district court in this action concluded 
that the priority of the lien under the Horbach Judgment was the date it was reinstated 
which was junior in priority to the foreclosed trust deed. Consequently, the foreclosure 
of that senior trust deed extinguished the lien of the Horbach Judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, 
PFC caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to schedule an execution sale of the 
subject property for November 20, 2001. MP Ventures brought this suit to enjoin the 
Sheriffs sale. MP Ventures moved to enjoin the Sheriffs sale and sought a declaratory 
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judgment that PFC had no right to execute against the subject property. At the hearing on 
MP Venture's motion for a preliminary injunction, the parties stipulated that the facts 
were not in dispute and the court could make a final determination on the merits. After 
receiving memoranda and evidence supporting and opposing MP Venture's motion and 
hearing argument, the district court, the honorable Stephen L. Henriod presiding, issued a 
Memorandum Decision concluding that PFC's claimed lien on the subject property was 
inferior to the trust deed through which MP Venture's title was derived, and was 
extinguished by the trustee's sale under that trust deed. Accordingly, Judge Henriod 
enjoined PFC from executing its judgment lien against the subject property. PFC moved 
to amend the Memorandum Decision, which MP Ventures opposed. Judge Henriod 
subsequently rejected PFC's motion to amend the ruling by entering Findings of F.act and 
Conclusions of Law and a Final Judgment declaring that MP Ventures owns the subject 
property unencumbered by PFC's claimed judgment lien. PFC appealed from this Final 
Judgment. 
C, Statement of Facts. 
1. On April 18, 1994, Eugene Horbach obtained a judgment against 
Lan England in the amount of $169,501.75 plus interest and costs on his counterclaims in 
the action England v. Horbach, Civil No. 930901471CV (the "Horbach Judgment"). 
[Horbach Judgment R. 46-47, MP Ventures Addendum (MPV Add.) Exhibit 1]. 
2. England appealed the trial court's judgment, and on October 19, 
1995, the Utah Court of Appeals entered its opinion reversing the trial court and vacating 
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the trial court's judgment. The Court of Appeals' opinion specifically states: "we vacate 
the trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim, as defendant's right to 
reimbursement for overpayment was settled under the accord and satisfaction." England 
v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 301, 302 n.l. (1995) (emphasis added). [MPV Add. Ex. 2]. 
3. In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provided: 
(a) Date of Issuance. 
(2) In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue 
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or 
shortened by order of the court 
(b). . . A stay or supersedeas of the remittitur or an injunction pending application 
for review may be granted on motion and for good cause. A motion for a stay of 
the remittitur or for approval of a supersedeas bond . . . must ordinarily be made in 
the first instance in the court rendering the decision appealed from. A motion for 
such relief may be made in the reviewing court , . . . . A bond or other security on 
such terms as the court deems appropriate may be required as a condition to the 
grant or continuance of relief under this paragraph. 
U. R. App. P. 36 (1995). [MPV Add. Ex. 3]. 
4. The period for filing a writ for a petition for certiorari was 30 days 
after the entry of the Court of Appeals' decision, and this period ended on Monday, 
November 20, 1995. Utah R. App. P. 48 (1995). 
5. On November 20, 1995, Horbach filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Docket, MPV Add. Ex. 4]. 
6. On November 22, 1995, thirty-three days after the Court of Appeals 
entered its final decision, the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur to the district court 
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and the remittitur was docketed by the district court on December 1, 1995. [Remittitur, R. 
147-148, MPV Add. Ex. 5; Court of Appeals' Docket, R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex. 6; 
District Court Docket, R. 145]. 
7. Horbach did not move the Court of Appeals to stay the issuance of 
the remittitur, nor for an enlargement of the time for issuance of the remittitur. Likewise, 
Horbach did not ask the Court of Appeals to recall the remittitur, nor did he ask the 
Supreme Court to stay or recall the remittitur. [Appellate Dockets, R. 260-261, MPV 
Add. Ex.'s4, 6] 
8. On May 31, 1996, a deed of trust was recorded against the subject 
property with the trustor being Lan C. England and the beneficiary Option One Mortgage 
Corporation to secure a $500,000 loan from Option One Mortgage to Lan England, (the 
"Option One Trust Deed"). [Option One Trust Deed, R. 95-100, MPV Add. Ex. 7]. 
9. On May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion on the 
certiorari petition. That opinion reversed the Court of Appeals decision and reinstated the 
trial court's judgment. England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340. [MPV Add. Ex. 8]. 
10. The subject property was sold at a trustee's sale under the Option 
One Trust Deed on January 10, 2001. A trustee's deed was recorded at the Office of the 
Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder as, Entry No. 7797085, in Book 8414, at Page 8416 
naming Plaintiff Chase Manhattan Bank as Grantee. [Trustee's Deed, R 64-65]. 
11. Chase Manhattan Bank conveyed the subject property to Tim 
Linford, who in turn conveyed the subject property to MP Ventures. [Chain of Title, R 
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179-188]. 
12. PFC caused the Salt Lake County Sheriff to schedule an execution 
sale of the subject property for November 20, 2001. [Amended Complaint, R. 79-108]. 
13. The present action was brought before Judge Henriod by Chase 
Manhattan/MP Ventures to enjoin the Sheriffs sale and declare PFC's lien on the subject 
property extinguished by the foreclosure of the Option One Trust Deed. [Id.] 
14. Judge Henriod ruled that PFC's claimed judgment lien on the subject 
property was inferior to the Option One Trust Deed, and was extinguished by the trustee's 
sale. The district court concluded that a judgment lien does not exist independent of the 
judgment on which the lien is based. Consequently, when the Horbach Judgment was 
vacated, the judgment lien ceased to exist and did not encumber the subject property at 
the time the Option One Trust Deed was recorded. Judge Henriod further concluded that 
the priority of the lien arising under the reinstated judgment is the date the judgement was 
reinstated. [Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 268-274, MPV Add. Ex. 10; 
Final Judgment, R. 275-278, MPV Add. Ex. 11]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
PFC, the claimed owner of the Horbach Judgment does not hold a judgment lien 
against the subject property. A judgement lien does not exist independent of a valid, 
enforceable judgment. At the time the Option One Trust Deed was recorded, the Horbach 
Judgment had been vacated; it was not valid nor enforceable; and it did not create a lien 
on the subject property. Thus, PFC's judgment lien, which came into existence when the 
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Supreme Court reinstated the Horbach Judgment is inferior to the Option One Trust Deed, 
and was extinguished, as to the subject property, by the foreclosure of the Option One 
Trust Deed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION WAS NOT BASED ON THE 
TIMELINESS OF HORBACH'S PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI 
In PFC's first point, PFC claims that Judge Henriod based his decision on an error 
regarding the date and timeliness of Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari. [Appellant 
Brief at 17-19]. However, while the Memorandum Decision recites the date that the 
certiorari petition was docketed by the Court of Appeals rather than the date it was filed 
in the Supreme Court, that date is immaterial to the district court's decision. 
A. PFC Misconstrues The District Court's Decision 
MP Ventures agrees with PFC that Judge Henriod's Memorandum Decision 
incorrectly states that Horbach filed a petition for certiorari on November 24, 1995. 
[Mem. Dec. R. 213-215, MPV Add. Ex. 9]. November 24, 1995 is the day that the 
certiorari petition was docketed by the Utah Court of Appeals rather than the date the 
petition was filed with the Supreme Court. [Ct. App. Dckt. R. 261, MPV Add. Ex.6]. 
However, this date is not material to the district court's decision. Instead, the district 
court was concerned with the requirements of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The paragraph of the district court's Memorandum Decision at issue states: 
In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part, 
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that in the Court of Appeals, 
[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of 
the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
The time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days 
from the entry of the Court of Appeals' decision. In this case, on October 19, 
1995, the Court of Appeals issued a decision reversing and remanding the District 
Court's Order. Then, on November 22, 1995, more than thirty days later, the 
Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court. 
[Mem. Dec. R. 213, MPV Add. Ex. 9 at 1 (emphasis added)]. The reference in this 
paragraph to "more than thirty days later" concerns the proper time for the issuance of the 
remittitur. Consequently, the basis for Judge Henriod's decision was the proper timing 
and issuance of the remittitur by the Court of Appeals, not the date or timeliness of 
Horbach's petition for writ of certiorari. 
Furthermore, nowhere does Judge Henriod conclude that Horbach's petition was 
untimely, and, moreover, the date of the certiorari petition was correctly stated in the 
district court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law upon which the Final Judgment 
was based. [Findings, R. 270, MPV Add. Ex. 10 at no. 4 ].* Accordingly, PFC's 
argument that the district court erred in stating an improper date is based on PFC's 
misinterpretation of the district court's decision and is flatly wrong. 
B. Neither MP Ventures Nor PFC Raised Or Presented The Timeliness Of 
Horbach's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari As A Basis For The District 
Court's Decision 
1
 "On November 20, 1995, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the Court of Appeals." See Appellant 
Statement of Facts No. 8. 
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A review of the briefs before the district court shows that neither party argued nor 
discussed whether Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari was timely. Moreover, MP 
Ventures never raised this issue nor presented it to the district court as a basis for its 
decision. Accordingly, it is implausible that the district court sua sponte would seize on 
an erroneous date as the basis for its decision without greater elaboration in its decision. 
Instead, it is clear from Judge Henriod's Memorandum Decision and Findings of Facts 
and Conclusions of Law that the decision was based on the fact that adequate time had 
elapsed between the entry of the Court of Appeals' decision and the issuance of the 
remittitur. Hence, the district court's alleged error regarding the timeliness of Horbach's 
petition for a writ of certiorari is nothing more than a red-herring. 
C. MP Ventures Does Not Dispute That Horbach's Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari Was Timely Filed 
MP Ventures concedes that Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari was timely 
filed in 1995. This timeliness, however, does not change the material facts established in 
this suit; namely, that the Court of Appeals vacated the Horbach Judgment, and issued its 
remittitur to the trial court after the period for filing a writ of petition for certiorari had 
expired. 
In sum, Judge Henriod's decision was not based on a determination of the 
timeliness of Horbach's petition for a writ of certiorari, and the reference to that date in 
the Memorandum Decision is immaterial. 
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II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE 
CORRECT BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS ISSUED ITS 
REMITTITUR PROPERLY ACCORDING TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE 
OF THE RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, AND HORBACH 
CHOSE NOT TO REQUEST A STAY OF THE REMITTITUR 
In Point II of PFCs brief, PFC groups together four challenges to the district 
court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law. PFC claims that the district court 
erred because 
1. It disregarded the obvious purpose of Rule 36. [Appellant Brief at 19-20.] 
2. Applying Rule 36 according to its plain terms limits the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court. [Id at 20-21.] 
3. Horbach had no incentive to seek a stay of the remittitur. [Id at 21.] 
4. Even if Horbach had stayed the remittitur, it would not have been effective. 
Ud.] 
PFC's challenges are unfounded, and MP Ventures will address each one in order. 
A. The Court of Appeals Properly Issued Its Remittitur According to the 
Plain Language of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Then in Effect 
PFC claims that the district court erred by ignoring that "the purpose of the rule 
[36] was obviously to provide that if a petition for wit (sic) of certiorari is indeed granted, 
the record would be remitted to the Supreme Court." [Appellant Brief at 19 (emphasis 
added)]. Thus, PFC concludes the district court failed to recognize that "the record on 
appeal was inadvertently transferred by the clerk of the Court of Appeals to the District 
Court. . . . " [ M a t 20]. 
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PFC's argument is wrong because the obvious purpose of Rule 36 that PFC claims 
the district court ignored directly contradicts the plain, unambiguous language of the rule 
then in effect. In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provided: 
(2) In the court of appeals the remittitur of the court shall issue 
immediately after the expiration of the time for filing a petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 
(3) The time for issuance of the remittitur may be stayed, enlarged, or 
shortened by order of the court. 
Utah R. App. P. 36 (1995) (emphasis added). [MPV Add. Ex. 3]. 
In cases determining the operation of procedural rules "this court has consistently 
looked to the plain language of the applicable rule when construing it, thereby declining 
to read additional language into the rule." Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001 UT 61, \ 11, 29 P.3d 
1225 (interpreting filing requirements under rules 3 and 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure).2 There is nothing ambiguous about Rule 36 as it was written in 1995. 
According to PFC the obvious purpose of Rule 36 was automatically to stay the remittitur 
upon the filing of a petition for certiorari until the Supreme Court disposed of the 
application for review. [Appellant Brief at 19]. However, Rule 36 plainly sets forth that 
the remittitur may be stayed by order of the court, not by filing a petition for certiorari. 
Moreover, Rule 36 provided that a stay of the remittitur could be had "on motion and for 
good cause . . . ordinarily . . . in the court rendering the decision appealed from." U. R. 
2
 See also, Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952, 955 (Utah 
1984) (applying procedural rule according to "plain, unambiguous language"); 
Hausknecht v. Industrial Comm 7i, 882 P.2d 683, 685 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (applying 
plain language of mandatory rule of appellate procedure). 
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App. P. 36(1995). 
Furthermore, Rule 36 commanded that the Court of Appeals shall issue the 
remittitur after the time for filing a petition for certiorari has expired. The use of the word 
"shall" is presumed to mean mandatory. Ostler v. Buhler, 1999 UT 99, % 7, 989 P.2d 
1073 (citing Board ofEduc. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 
1035 (Utah 1983)). Thus, Rule 36 required the Court of Appeals to issue the remittitur 
after the period for filing a petition for certiorari expired, with no provision to stay the 
remittitur except by court order. Consequently, the plain language of Rule 36 directly 
contradicts the obvious purpose that PFC claims the district court ignored. 
Similarly, PFC's contention that the "record on appeal was inadvertently 
transferred by the clerk . . . to the District Court" must be rejected. Instead, the Court of 
Appeals issued its remittitur properly and effectively to the trial court in compliance with 
the requirements of Rule 36. There is no dispute that the period for filing a petition for a 
writ of certiorari was thirty days after the Court of Appeals entered its decision. U. R. 
App. P. 48. There is no dispute that the Court of Appeals properly issued its remittitur 
thirty-three days after it issued its decision, [Remittitur, R. 147-148, MPV Add. Ex. 5; Ct. 
App. Dckt, R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex. 6], and there is no dispute that Horbach did not 
ask the Court of Appeals, nor the Supreme Court to stay the remittitur, or to recall the 
remittitur. U. R. App. P. 36(a)(2) - (b); [Appellate Dckts., R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4, 
6]. Thus, the Court of Appeals properly transmitted the record to the trial court in 
accordance with the requirements of Rule 36. 
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Finally, PFC cites Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Assoc, v. Foothills Water Co., 
942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996), for the proposition that Rule 36 was amended to conform with 
case law apparently recognizing an automatic stay of the remittitur upon filing a petition 
for writ of certiorari. [Appellant Brief at 20]. However, neither Hi-Country Estates nor 
White v. State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990), support the proposition that Rule 36 was 
amended to conform to case law that required Rule 36 to be applied in any manner other 
than according to its plain terms. Additionally, at the time of the Horbach suit, nowhere 
did the rules, case law or statutes state that if a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed, 
the Court of Appeals' remittitur was automatically stayed. 
Furthermore, Hi-Country Estates does not control this case because it is 
distinguishable. First, and most importantly, in Hi-Country Estates this Court held that 
the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur prematurely and ineffectively because it was 
issued before the time for filing a petition for certiorari had expired. 942 P.2d at 306, 
307. In contrast, in this case, the Court of Appeals properly issued its remittitur, after the 
time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari had expired. [Remittitur, R. 147-148, MPV 
Add. Ex. 5; Ct. App. Dckt. R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex. 6]. Second, in Hi-Country 
Estates, this Court held that the Court of Appeals erred when it denied Foothills' request 
to recall its remittitur. Id. at 307; Acosta v. Labor Comm 'n, 2002 UT App. 67, ^13. 
There is no corresponding error in this case because Horbach did not seek a stay of the 
remittitur nor a recall of the remittitur from the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court. 
[Appellate Dckts., R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4, 6]. Finally, in Hi-Country Estates, the 
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trial court granted affirmative relief to the parties upon the authori ty of the premature ly 
issued remittitur. 942 P.2d at ^ A T" this case, the nnl\ issue r, v\ hcllici a j u d g m e n t lien 
is pi esei v ed af tei tl ic C : i at t • : f \ ppea l s vacates tl ic ji idgi i ici it ait i :1 pi opci ly i ei i lits the case 
to the trial court. Fhe trial coui t did not gi aiit any affirmative rel ief to the par t ies after the 
issuance of the reinittitui Tlms, Hi-Country Estates does not suppor t P F C ' s proposi t ion 
that i .ik *6 was amended to confoi :t i i to existii ig case law, i 101: does it coi lti ol tl ic 
c i ltcoi i le of tl lis case. 
In sum, Rule 36, as it was written iii 1995, was plain and unambiguous . It required 
the Court of \ p p e a l s to issue its remittitur offer i | l c p e n , . ; ;. ; .mj_T a petit ion for a writ of 
according to the rule ' s requirements . 
B The 1995 Version of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Does Not Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court 
PPf 1 \ ne> f claim a dial ii|»pl\ niu K'ule Ut as il w.is n r i l l n u n I *>*'*>, w iu 
somehow "limit the jur isdic t ion of the Supreme C o u r t . . as es tabl ished by law." 
[Appellant Br ief at 20] . However , P F C makes no i inn u > ^ p i , i m n<^. ^e proper 
issiiai ice of tl ic i c i i littiti n t :»tl le tit la! cc i ii it l::a tl ic ( xyi n t : f \ ppeals ii i. ai iia wa) i edi iced tl le 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the England v. Horbach suit. It is simply unclear how 
the Court of Appeals, which followed the plain language of Rule 36 somehow 
circi n i isc! ibed tl: ic Si lpi ei i ic Coi II t's ability ' to i c vac ^ ' ill lat case Vccoi dii igl/y , PFC's 
argument should be disregarded. 
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C. Horbach Allowed the Court of Appeals to Vacate His Judgment by Not 
Requesting a Stay of the Remittitur. 
PFC claims that Horbach, as the judgment creditor, had no incentive to request a 
"stay of the opinion of the Court of Appeals because the opinion did not become 
operative until the case was remanded to the District Court and a judgment vacated." 
[Appellant Brief at 21]. However, PFC fails to acknowledge the requirements of Rule 36 
that applied to this case. In 1995, Rule 36 required the Court of Appeals to issue its 
remittitur to the District Court after the period for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari 
expired. U. R. App. P. 36(a)(2) (1995). In order to stay the effect of the Court of Appeals' 
decision, Rule 36 placed the burden squarely.upon Horbach to make a motion to the 
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to stay the remittitur. Id. 36(a)(3) - (b); State v. 
Palmer, 802 P.2d 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Hi-Country Estates, 942 P.2d at 305. 
However, Horbach chose not to pursue these procedural options, and allowed his 
judgment to remain vacated while his case was reviewed by the Supreme Court. 
[Appellate Dckts., R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4, 6]. 
The consequences of Horbach's choice are similar to those faced by the defendants 
in Bulmash v. Davis, 597 P.2d 469 (Cal 1979), a case very closely on point. Addressing 
the same issue that is before this court, the Bulmash court noted that a judgment creditor 
has the ability to preserve its lien when a judgment is vacated and the vacating order 
appealed: 
Here, defendant had the ability to protect his rights after the vacating order by 
requesting a stay of that order. Had he requested and obtained a stay, he would 
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have been allowed to retain h^ :icn by filing an undertaking insuring that he would 
pay all costs and damages which the plaintiffs would sustain by reason of the lien 
in the event that the order of the court below were sustained in favor of the 
plaintiffs. Because no stay order was even requested, however, the vacated 
judgment was invalid during the appeal and there was no defect in the proper* 
the time it was transferred. 
597 P.2d at 472-73. Similarly, 1lorbach had the power to prevent his judgment from 
being vacated by seeking a stay of the remittitur. 
The MliiiDi,1. < 'mill n! \pp».\ils addicssed a simihii MIIMII n in
 ( ,»/ AV Estate nf 
Harold Grabow, 392 N.E.2d 980, 983-85 (111. \pp Ct. , v / V .a Grabow, a residuary 
legatee complained of actions taken In die circuit oniri \\Ur !l -..Mini of appeals issued 
its mandate, bul w hile (he legatee's petition for certiorari was pending in the state 
siip . * | In el inn | i if ;(p|H\ih slated 
Another contention of the appellant-beneficiary is that tlic probate court had 
no jurisdiction to approve the final accounting because there were two appeals 
pending on matters pertinent to the estate. . . . The mandates issued on June 8, 
1978, the appellant not yet having filed an affidavit of intent to seek review in the 
Illinois Supreme Court. Both were recalled June 21, 1978, after petitions for leave 
to appeal to the supreme court were filed on June 16, 1979 (sic). Both petitions 
were denied on September 28, 1978, and the mandates were reissued from this 
court on October 26, 1978. . . . 
It seems clear that the first issuance of the mandate properly revested 
jurisdiction in the probate court. ( Busser v. Noble (1961), 32 111. App. 2d 181. 
N.E.2d 2 5 1 . ) . . . . Of course, the losing party has 56 days following the entry of 
the judgment to file a petition for leave to appeal in the supreme court. . . . In the 
event a petition is filed, the mandate may upon just terms be recalled until the 
petition is ruled on oi a final disposition is had. . . . ( • il •- -\^ . • -:-ui is filed 
before the mandate issues does the filing of the petition h\ itself affect the 
jurisdiction of the lower courts. 
From a fair reading of these rules, it is apparent that once the mandate is 
filed in the circuit court, that court is revested with jurisdiction until a higher court, 
or judge thereof, issues a stay or recalls the mandate regardless of the fact that a 
petition for leave to appeal has subsequently been, filed in the supreme court. Had 
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the supreme court intended otherwise, it would have so provided. 
. . . Ms. Galvin cannot now be heard to complain because she failed to take 
the necessary action to obtain a stay or recall of the mandate. 
392 N.E.2d at 983-84 (interior citations omitted). Thus, according to the Illinois rules, a 
petition for certiorari filed after 21 days from the court's decision does not automatically 
stay the mandate, id., and if the appellant does not take the necessary procedural 
precautions, it cannot complain of further action taken by the lower court:.3 The same is 
true in the federal court system. See Blum v. Caldwell, 446 U.S.1311; 100 S.Ct. 1635; 64 
L.Ed.2d 225 (1980); Owens v. Hewell, 474 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996);' 
Wheeler v. Goulart, 623 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C. 1993).5 
Horbach could have kept a judgment lien in place by seeking a stay or recall of the 
remittitur. Additionally, if Horbach's request to the Court of Appeals had been refused, 
3
 Other jurisdictions requiring an appellant to seek a stay of the remittitur when 
applying for review in the state supreme court include Colorado C.A.R. 41; Illinois 
Supreme Ct.R36& and North Carolina N.C. App.Proc.R.32. 
4
 We find no support for the contention that the filing of a petition for a writ 
of certiorari prevents the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
from becoming final until the United States Supreme Court acts upon the 
petition, where no stay of mandate has been filed under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 
2101 (f). . . . While it is true that the actual granting of a writ of certiorari 
does operate as a stay the mere petition for certiorari does not have such an 
effect. 
Id. (citations and footnote omitted). 
5
 The principal concern here is the assertion by appellant that she was denied 
the possibility of further review of our judgment in the United States 
Supreme Court because of the settlement during the time within which at 
least theoretically appellant could have sought certiorari. However, 
appellant took no advantage of our procedures to stay the issuance of the 
mandate provided in D.C. App. R. 4Kb): . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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he could have sought a stay in this Court. U. R. App. P. 36(b). However, Horbach elected 
. , i . - • • : • - . UL-Kib.,R. 260-261, MPV Add. Ex.'s 4. Had 
•rbach felt it necessary, or w o n / *•;!•*. to preserve the priority of in-, .u.lgmc;.; \n n ie 
could have accomplished i • = i " M a * ^ manner that would have avoided iH 
the relief that Horbach failed to seek nearly seven years ago, nui. as 1 loiluelfs successor, 
PFC can only obtain the same rights that Horbach elected to preserve for himself 
^ A Stay of the Court of Appeals' Remittitur Would Have Prevented 
I lorbach's Judgment From, Being Vacated 
11 i , >iMiii 11.11 < ill If nil li i drlri mint III" zi'il'ii e of PH '^ u riutit nl in I he I mil Ih 
point of this section. PFC seems to eiann that a sta\ ol L-\Lxai. n >\t>ui»i have no cticu on 
•• Men because the creation of a judgment lien arises automatically b\ operation nl law. 
of this argument, if Horbach had obtained a stay of the issuance of the remittitiir until Ilis 
petition for a writ of certiorai i had been acted unon h\ 'U* Si.p*erne Court, it would have 
prevented his judgment from being vacated \ppcais. i OMI : 
of the remittitur and the posting of security would have prevented the problem of which 
PI C l i low col i lplaii is. 
In sum, the district court's decision should be affirmed because the Coin t of 
App. oi~; issiuui . • : . . - . , . .
 i : i\ p-.-in i ia^na^. and reaiiiivments • -f R"fo 36 
IM!K i tali Kuk-, .»: Appellate l^'oeeiluu Uiat were in elleel al ;iv ;a;;. . .A\-,\ :. ; .. 
could have sought a stay of the remittitur at thai tunc and avoided these issues. 
III. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI DID NOT REVERSE THE COURT OF 
APPEAI,S DECISION AND REINSTATE THE HORBACH JUDGMENT 
In Point III of PFCs brief, PFC claims that ueeanse the -\!•«* of -'-norar was 
granted before the Option One 1 rust Deed was reconk . :*. : :;• • . •;• in 
21855vl 19 
concluding that the priority of the Horbach Judgment lien was inferior to the trust deed. 
[Appellant Brief at 21-22]. 
First, the petition for a writ of certiorari, though granted, did not reverse the Court 
of Appeals' decision and reinstate the judgment. The grant of the petition merely 
permitted further appellate review. 
Second, PFC complains, apparently as a matter of public policy, that the 
beneficiary of the trust deed "took the property subject to the [potential] lien against the 
subject property." Id. Where the action affects the title to or possession of property, 
section 78-40-2 of the Utah Code permits a party to record a lis pendens at the county 
recorder's office to provide notice of the pending action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2. The 
Horbach action, however, was an action for a money judgment, and did not involve the 
subject property at all. Consequently, no lis pendens was recorded, and there was nothing 
in the real property records to afford notice of a potential judgment lien. Moreover, there 
is no authority for the proposition that a vacated judgment or a writ of certiorari provide 
constructive notice of an interest in real property. Under the judgment lien statute, a lien 
does not exist independently of the judgment and, therefore, ceases to exist when a 
judgment is vacated.6 If PFC's argument were accepted and the mere pendency of an 
appeal would provide constructive notice of a potential judgment against all of the real 
property of the potential judgment debtor, all property of anyone sued in a lawsuit would 
be rendered unmarketable. Such a result would give a potential judgment creditor a pre-
6
 Utah Code Ann.^ 78-22-1 (lien attaches to property during existence of 
judgment); Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938, 939 (Utah 1988) ("our statutory scheme 
has no provision for an extension of a judgment lien independent of the judgment on 
which it is based."); Bulmash, 597 P.2d at 470 ("A lien is accessory to the obligation on 
which it is based; therefore, it would ordinarily be automatically invalid once the 
judgment was vacated."); Schlossberg v. Citizens Bank of Maryland, 672 A.2d 625, 629 
(Md. Ct. App. 1996) ("vacated means that the judgment is cancelled and consequently a 
dependent judgment lien is destroyed.") (quoting In re Broyles, 161 B.R. 149, 155 
(Bankr. D.Md. 1993) affd Broyles v. Schlossberg, 81 F.3d 27 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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judgment wiit of attachment against all ofthe potential judgment debtor's real property 
'
 !
 ntt 101 it tl ic pi otection of a be nd ai id without due process. 
Finally, PFC incorrectly characterizes the district court's ruling. Judge Henriod 
d"f i'"i inlr th:ii NDIIVII'I* W;I in ;i Ivili r position t* *M-ot.vt ^ : judgment because the loan 
was made befoii nu ^m - \ . riii-.uii was granted. [Appellant Bnei . M.\I<;, 
Judge Henriod adopted the rationale that Horbach could have protected his judgment and 
!; : • •• I ' •• * : *t - ^ v supra 
M > \ ( tuh *< ipr i\ 36(a)(2) - (U)\ State v. Palmer, So; i d -4Sii iah \;-., 'oom 
Because a stay was available upon posting a supersedeas bond. as- a matter of r iblic 
policy, 1 101 bacl i, PFC's pi edecessor, was v ' .••!]•«- tl I " C : I n t 
of Appeals' remittitur and protect the priori t> oi the hen arising from his judgment. 
I ' PFC'S LIEN BASED ON THE HORBACH J UDGMEN I IS INFERIOR I O 
THE BENEFICIARY'S INTEREST CREATED BY THE OPTION ONE 
TRUST DEED 
1 1 | I ' m i l "• i • . • • ; » ; -• ; ; i • " ' • ' • • : ' l a d e 
this Court that its hen was superior u> the interest created b\ ine Option * >ne I s ast Deed. 
PFC claii ns tl mt: 
1 The district eoml erred by applying the rationale of a renewal judgment 
when the judgment in this case was reinstated. [Appellant Brief, Sub-Point 
A at 22-2J.J 
2. The judgment was not vacated by the Court of Appeals ! ul. Sub-Point B at 
24 ] 
3. Even if the (VUM * ! Appeals \aeated die judgment, whet - A as reinstated, 
it regained | »; f u . : ! • u n t - i : -,. 
2 6 . ] 
4. The grant of certiorari ii i lpai ted i lotice tc tl ic t:t i ist deed bei leficiai ) r f i a 
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Sub- Point D at 26-27.] 
PFC's assertions are not valid, and they should be rejected. MP Ventures addresses these 
arguments in turn. 
A. The District Court was Correct in Concluding That the Priority of the 
Lien Arising From a Reinstated Judgement Does Not Relate Back to 
the Date of the Vacated Judgment 
PFC argues that the district court erred because it adopted the rationale in Cox 
Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988), to conclude that the priority of the lien, arising 
from the Horbach Judgment, is based on the date it was reinstated. PFC's argument is 
that Cox addressed the renewal of a judgment, not the reinstatement of a judgment. 
[Appellant Brief at 23]. Apart from distinguishing Cox on that ground, PFC offers no 
authority or explanation as to how a lien survives between the time when a judgment is 
vacated and the time when it is reinstated. 
It is true that in Cox the Supreme Court considered whether the Hem of a renewal 
judgment would relate back to the date of the original judgment. However, the rationale 
of the Cox decision is applicable to this case. In Cox this Court concluded that when a 
judgment expires, or ceases to exist, so does the lien. 
The lien of a renewal judgment attaches only from the date of entry of the new 
judgment and does not relate back to the date of the original judgment or extend 
the prior lien. A renewal of a judgment results in a new judgment, which when 
docketed creates a new lien. 
754 P.2d at 939 (citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, there can be no dispute 
that a judgment lien is strictly limited by the terms of the statute that created it: "[a] 
judgment lien is purely a creation of statute. It does not exist in common law; therefore, 
the rights of the parties must be determined within the statutory framework." Id. Indeed, 
at all pertinent times, section 78-22-1 provided: "the entry of judgment by a district court 
is a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, owned 
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or acquired dunng the existence of the judgment" Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1 (emphasis 
;i H ( 1 p ( t ")i I T i ( »t h e t i i / ( > t • • I s:} a 1 i e i i o i 11 y a 11 a c 1 i e s d l 11 i it i g 11 i e e x i s t e n. c e o f 11 i e 111 c 1 g m e n t.... 1 1 i c " i e 
! -, n*) hen w HiKhii • j u d g m e n t . See supra note 6; In re Infiltrator Sys., hu ,2^' H ! 
777 (Bankr. D. Conn 2000) (Florida judgment not entered in Connect icut according to 
statutoi y i eqi lii et i. ie;t its does i lot ci eate liei i) Ii istice Zii r in iei t i lai i, : oi I z\ ii i i.i ig v 'Till i. tl l : 
Cox majority, conceded that "it is impossible to interpret our statute as permit t ing suivival 
oi tl le lien without the sui vival of the under! ym<> liability.' ' id. at 940. 
In this case, after the Court of Appeals vacated the Horbach Judgment the 
judi \r.- \ aid not exist. Correspondingly, any lien based oii the I Iorbach Judgment also 
ceased to exist. 
Applyii ig tl IC i ationale in Cox to tb * -KM-- n»'4us case is consistent with other 
courts addressing similar c i rcumstances \nv \ \ a summarv ; IM. • \ 
entered by the tria; - -;n : I • • • .4 court subsequently vacated the j u d g m e n t and an 
app--- *<^t»L.'i " • • •: i ]•• Mding, ine judgine ;i debtors 
sold hoii.c of their real property V -i»rd parties, hi. a; Some (,mc later, the 
California Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment aiid ordered the \ aca tu i 
judgm< nl In In1 i i" . tmnl ' i In ilr\i ulnm\ llie ISSIK lln Hu • -s s •H" IIY.IH: 
before us is w heiher a IK n pursuant to judgment relates back u» ihe oi miuai vi* •" 
recording after reversal of the order vacating the judgment . " >! u 4 Vi The o n n i held 
t h i l l t i n l i t i i in" I n II in (" 11 0 , 1 n I in i u l i l l i • i l n
 l L | ) [ i i M l l l l g ( M i l \ o h l H U » a b . , . i | » i e v ( i i i 
enforcement of the vacating order. The court's analysis is instructive: 
A lien therefore cannot exist apart from the judgment upon which it is 
based. Thus, in the ordinary course of events when the judgment is vacated 
by court order the lien will also cease to exist, because the effect of a 
vacating order is to eliminate the judgment. . . . Once vacated, the status of 
the parties that existed prior to the judgment is restored and the situation 
then prevailing is the same as though the order or jildgment had never been 
made. 
BecaiJM' Ihe judj'.iin nl » < i;l« I hoi be enfourd »>fi< < it w ,i\ > ac.ilrd lln hm 
) i 
21855vl ' ' 
also became ineffective. Accordingly, the land was not subject to a lien at 
the time of its transfer. 
Id. at 471-72 (emphasis added); accord 46 Am Jur. 2d Judgments § 409, at 708 (1994). In 
reaching its conclusion, the California court noted that the judgment creditor "had the 
ability to protect his rights after the vacating order by requesting a stay of that order," and 
that if a stay had been obtained, "he would have been allowed to retain his lien by filing 
an undertaking insuring that he would pay all costs and damages which the plaintiffs 
would sustain by reason of the lien in the event that the order of the court below were 
sustained in favor of plaintiffs." Id. at 472-73. The Utah Supreme Court adopted the 
identical analysis in holding that the reversal of an order releasing a lis pendens does not 
revive the lis pendens as of the date it was originally recorded unless there is a stay of the 
order upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. See Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 
1393 (Utah 1996). 
Decisions from New York and Colorado also make it clear that the lien of a 
reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of reinstatement. In Mansfield State 
Bank v. Cohn, N.Y.S.2d 555 (N.Y. Supp. 1981) affd sub nom, 451 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. 
A.D. 1982) and 446 N.E.2d 768 (N.Y. 1983), the New York court was faced with the 
issue of determining the priority of a Texas judgment filed in New York, subsequently 
vacated and then reinstated by Texas courts.7 The New York court held that the lien was 
not in effect during the period that the judgment was vacated and the property could be 
sold, concluding "the vacating of a judgment renders it no longer in existence and any 
liens evolving therefrom are dissolved." 436 N.Y.S.2d at 557. Similarly, in First 
National Bank ofTelluride v. Fleisher, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a 
7
 "The issue to be determined is whether the final appellate reversal of a judgment 
or order of an intermediate appellate court, which had reversed and vacated an initial 
judgment of a trial court, reinstates the original trial court judgment as of the date it was 
originally entered." Id. at 557. 
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judgment's priority would not relate back to the entry of an earlier deiai.- ^pigment that 
had been vacated b) the trial court. 2 P.3d 706. 71 ^  ' ^  (<••..• •<><)()). Consequently, a 
trust need gram • • ' • . • * . • ' ; • K "^ 
before final judgment was entered, had priority over the judgment lien u ai ? 
Accordii igly, the district court was correct in applying the rationale of the Cox decision 
and ruling that tl ic priority p f p r r \ lien i^  ociesnuned !. ;n . . wl ic i i I ioi bach's 
judgment was reinstated. 
Ill The Court of Appeals V aeated the Horbach Judgment 
in PFC's second poii it Sub-Point B, PFC argues that the Court of Appeals did not 
vacate the Horbach Judgment because wl lei i I loi bac 1 i filed 1 lis petitioi i tc i a wi it of 
certiorari tin: ea--e -A I a = ; undei appellate review. [Appellant Brief at 24]. However, 
d^r- r": • ' • * • . . " . . . *-ates,t\ • ' i--u did vacate the 
Horbach Judgment because the language in the opinion ;s clcai, it was within the 
jurisdiction and Mv pouer of the Court ot'Appeals to v^ u ate the judgment; and the Court 
First, the language of the Court of Appeals' opinion leaves no room to o lestion the 
c o i F f \ oidei " ' i " " ( niirt " I \ p p ' \ i ! • .Litt A l , u r V;T< if'" ( l ie ip;i l n i l 1 judgment based 
upon defendant's counterclaim, " England e. Horbach, {H^ V 2d ,n M)2 « a^ 
language is simple, clear and not subject to confusion: the Horbach Judgment was 
vacated. 
Second, the Conn ol \ ppeals had proper jurisdiction and the resulting authority to 
"reverse, , r ' ' • vv ise dispose of ai \y oi :lei oi ji idgi i lei it appealer • 
Utah R. \nr* /'. H)(a). \ acating the Horbach Judgment was well within the scope of he 
Court of Appeals'power. See e.g. Merhish / ; J ^uh-^mti >\ssoc, 646 P.?d 7 *i ^>3 
(I Jtal I 1* ".: . . appropriate actioi I foi at I • :• • : • 
lower court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss." (internal citation omitted))/ 
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Eckard v. Smith, 545 P.2d 501, 502 (Utah 1976) (appellate court vacating decree of 
specific performance). Hence, not only was it within the Court of Appeals' power and 
jurisdiction to vacate the trial court's judgment, the language of the court's opinion leaves 
no question that it exercised this power. 
Third, the Court of Appeals' vacatur of the Horbach Judgment was effective 
because the court properly remitted the case to the trial court pursuant to Rule 36 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Again, PFC relies on High Country Estates in its 
attempt to convince this Court that the Court of Appeals' action was not effective. 
However, High Country Estates is markedly different from this case. In High Country 
Estates, the Supreme Court granted Foothills an extension of time for filing a petition for 
a writ of certiorari. 942 P.2d at 305. The Court of Appeals remitted the case to the trial 
court before the period for Foothills to file its petition for a writ of certiorari had expired. 
Id. Therefore, this Court held that: 
[a]t the time the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur, this Court had extended 
Foothills' time to file a petition for certiorari. Foothills' time to seek certiorari had 
therefore not expired. The Court of Appeals issued its remittitur prematurely, and 
jurisdiction was never returned to the trial court. 
Id. at 306. As a result, the Court held that: [t]he judgment of the district court is void 
because the court had no jurisdiction to enter a judgment while the case was still pending 
in the appellate court." Id. at 307. 
In contrast, in this case, Judge Henriod correctly concluded that the Court of 
Appeals issued its remittitur properly and effectively according to the requirements of 
Rule 36 then in effect. The Court of Appeals' decision was entered on October 19, 1995. 
[MPV Add. Ex. 2]. Thirty-three days later, on November 22, 1995, after the period for 
filing a petition for a writ of certiorari had expired, the Court of Appeals remitted the case 
back to the trial court. [Remittitur, R. 147-148, MPV Add. Ex. 5]. Horbach's time to file 
a petition for certiorari from the Supreme Court had not been extended, and in fact, 
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Horbach timely filed his petition within .n i iiiu-day period allowed n> me rue of 
appellate procedure. U. R. i ipp.PA%. [Sup < i O^t , MPV A( Id. Ex. 4] Fhus, unhke 
the court ., ., yji Country Estates, the Coir •, .- : 'se 
- ML 'i M! court prematurely. 
i \dditioi lally, ii i Hig h Country Estc ties, the ( * ;; ' ' A . =" • ! so ci i ed becai ise it 
refused to recall the prematurely issued remittitur. {)42 \} Jd u ^C: Acosta v. Labor 
Comm n
 1
>l)()b, 1 ' I »[ -|» i. ', |^ 13. Foothill; appropriately petitioned the Court of Appeals 
to recalls its remittitur, and even moved ! = • ., ,..i .-• ia poKvedm-j- pri.-. 
certiorari re\ie\\. (U2 P,M ai M):\ hi coiurast. l lorkkh chose not to seek a stay of the 
i - '^ • -: i ! * i ' Mpcilate Dcklb., R. 
260-261, MPV \>ii 1*.\. s 4, o|. instead. I ioibach Jlo\\cd his judgment to be vacated 
while he sought further review from the Supreme Court. 
Finally, in High Country Estates, the trial coiirt entered an order granting 
affirmative relief between the parties after the remittitur issued prematurely. Iti contrast, 
in Ihis case, tlieic is no «tt^irm«tti\ \ n In fdial ocvttf ird .dler (lit (VMHIIIIMI issurd. 
C. Since the Horbach Judgment Was Vacated, the Lien Ceased to Exist, 
and When the Judgment Was Reinstated, the Lien Did Not Spring into 
Existence at an Earlier Date 
I n - • > • . •
 s ( i i . ... J; u,\ -, - n ^ ... 
reinstated, then the hen came into existence as of an earner date. [Appellant Briet .-A J S-
26]. PFC's reliance on /AMI //? r. General Tire and Rubber Co., 302 P.2d 712 (I Itah 
19 5 6), foi t; 1 i i s "; it r < I . \l; t1 e t. 111 n I 111 V v ( t1111' I" / A 1 1 i tt 11 d<11 r i > i i 1 1111' 
date from which to calculate post judgment interest. In other words, tlle issue was 
whether a judgment debtor is entitled to interest as of tin* dale of" the ordinal judgment or 
as of tl ic date of i eii lstatei i ici it. 302 I ' 2d at 712 • ' = •• • i i n i s ft oni 
the date that the indebtedness was correctly established, the date of the original judgment. 
M a t 714. 
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In this case, however, PFC's claim is a full degree removed from the issue in 
Hewitt. In Hewitt, the Court determined the date of indebtedness in order to calculate the 
correct amount of post judgment interest on that debt. In contrast, PFC seeks to establish 
the date of priority of a lien that arises pursuant to an enforceable judgment. The date of 
the lien's priority is completely distinct from the amount of indebtedness or proper 
interest on that debt which was at issue in Hewitt. In fact, the lien's priority date has no 
effect on the amount of Horbach's judgment nor the interest to accrue on that debt. 
While a court may determine the date of indebtedness between parties in order to 
grant complete relief between them, it is quite different to ask this Court to place a lien 
for a debt ahead of third parties. Horbach was granted complete relief in his action, and 
the date of the lien's priority does not alter the amount of that judgment nor the interest 
accruing on that judgment. PFC asks this Court to alter the priority of the lien in relation 
to a third party and on property neither of which were involved in the underlying suit. As 
explained earlier, the judgment lien does not exist independently of the judgment. See 
supra note 6. Therefore, PFC's lien came into existence at the time the Supreme Court 
reinstated the previously vacated judgment, and not before. 
D. The Supreme Court's Decision to Accept a Petition for Certiorari Does 
Not Create a Lis Pendens on Property Unrelated to the Litigation, and, 
Horbach, PFC's Predecessor, Was in the Best Position to Preserve the 
Priority of His Judgment Lien, 
PFC claims that because the Supreme Court granted Horbach's petition for a writ 
of certiorari before the Option One Trust Deed was recorded, the trust deed beneficiary 
should be deemed to have notice of PFC's "potential lien" in the same manner of a lis 
pendens. [Appellant Brief at 26-27]. However, PFC points to no authority to support its 
assertion that a petition for a writ of certiorari granted by the Supreme Court places a lis 
pendens on property that is not subject to the litigation. Moreover, as discussed above, 
the action between England and Horbach was one for a money judgment, and it did not 
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affect the title to nor the right of possession of the subject property. See Utah Code Ann. 
§78-40-2.8 "Utah law does not allow for the filing of lis pendens in cases seeking a 
money judgmei : \ \ * . * s », t'•> '-u .1 • '_ 'J ,H*( Winters 
v. Schulmann, 1999 I J T App 119 ffi| 22-22, 977 P.2d 1218. 1 1 11 is, this Cour t ' s acceptance 
of I lot bach ' s petitioi 1. foi cei tioi ai i did 1 IC t pi it tl ne ti 1 1st deed beneficiary on notice of a 
"potential lien." 
CONCLUSION 
In sun1, the priority of PFC's claimed judgment lien on the subject property was 
Trust Deed was recorded. Because the liei1 of the 1einstatedjudgment was junioi m 
priority, it was foreclosed h\ M, :rustee's sale under the Option One I n^f Deed. Wv ihe 
foregoii tg reasoi is Appe s ^-^r1 i! ; -; - • • - • • tl i.e 
district c o u r t ' s j u d g m e n t , and a ,\ ;u"(i u> Ml ' \ cntures its costs on appea l pu i s im- i .« -
34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Respectfully submitted this ^J_ day of May, 2002. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
By: ^ JJ//) 
Ro^jdHg^-Rtissell 
Jeffipy D. Stevens 
Attorneys for Appellee 
8
 Ii1 any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff . . or . . the defendant. . . may file for record with the recorder of the county in 
which the property or some part tl lereof is situated a notice of the pendency of the action . 
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GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BEHDINCER & 
PETERSON 
170 South Main, 1400 
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Telephone: (801) 533-8383 
Steven L. Taylor (13210) 
Of Counsel with 
MURPHY, TOLBOE 6 XABET 
124 South 600 East, 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 533-8505 
Attorneys for Defendant 
in THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAXX COUHTf 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAW C, ENGLAND, 
Plaintiff, 
ve, 
EUGENE HORBACH, an Individual, 
KEDICOOK, INCORPORATED, ft 
Utah corporation, and DOES I 
throuqh Y, 
Defendants* 
The above-en titled matter cajee on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable J. Dennlsj Frederick, sitting without a Jury, 
on May 22, 1994. The Court having considered the oral and 
documentary evidence presented, the Issues having been duly tried 
and a decision having been duly rendered* It is hereby 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
1. That the Kay 23rd putative agreement between 
Plaintiff and Defendant was executed under a smtual mistake of 
EXHIBIT "A" 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 930901471CT 
Judge J, Dennis Frederick 
fact and was without consideration And, therefore, is 
unenforceable. 
2. That all causes of action contained in Plaintiff's 
Complaint are denied end dismissed with prejudice. 
3. That funds in escrow account no. 30804165 in the 
amount of 5369,140,60, held pursuant to the escrow agreement 
entered into by the Plaintiff, the Defendant and Guardian State 
Ban*, Salt LaXe City, Utah and all accrued interest shall be 
lsKiediately released and disbursed to the Defendant or to his 
attorneys of record. 
VV 4. That Judgment is granted to Defendant against the 
Plaintiff in the amount of $169,501.73. 
2 
Tab 2 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication m the Pacific Reporter. 
r^ 
OC: ' 3 1995 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS r O U P T p,f '-*PPEALS 
ooOoo 
Lan C. England, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Case No. 940695-CA v 
Eugene Horbach, and Medicode 
Incorporated, and Does 
I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
OPINION 
(For O f f i c i a l Publ ica t ion) 
F I L E D 
(October 19, 19951 
Third D i s t r i c t , S a l t Lake County 
The Honorable J . Dennis Freder ick 
Attorneys: Samuel D. McVey and Randy T. Austin, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Stephen G. Crockett, Steven E. McCowin, Wesley D. 
Felix, and Steven L. Taylor, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellees 
Before Judges Orme, Bench, and Billings. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Plaintiff, Lan C. England, appeals from the trial court's 
dismissal of his complaint and judgment in favor of defendant, 
Eugene Horbach. Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it 
held the parties7 accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. We 
agree and therefore reverse and remand.1 
1. Because we conclude the trial court erred when it found the 
accord and satisfaction was unenforceable, we need not reach 
plaintiff's remaining claims on appeal. Moreover, we vacate the 
trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim, as 
defendant's right to reimbursement for overpayment was settled 
under the accord and satisfaction. 
FACTS 
In late 1989 or early 1990, plaintiff and defendant entered 
into a contract whereby defendant agreed to purchase 258,363 
shares of Medicode stock from plaintiff. The parties agreed the 
purchase price would be $2.75 per share, resulting in a total 
purchase price of $710,498.25. At trial, plaintiff testified and 
defendant did not dispute, that the purchase money was to be paid 
within the first .quarter of 1990. Defendant made periodic 
payments on the stock at least through September 1990. 
In May 19 91, at defendant's request, the parties met to 
finalize the stock purchase. At this time, plaintiff still 
retained the stock certificates and believed defendant owed 
additional money on the original purchase agreement. Plaintiff 
also believed defendant had breached the original stock purchase 
agreement by failing to pay the entire amount within the agreed 
time. At the May meeting, plaintiff informed defendant that at 
least $25,000 was still owing under the original purchase 
agreement. Defendant did not dispute that amount. The parties 
then reached an agreement whereby defendant agreed to remit to 
plaintiff an additional $25,000 and hold in trust two percent of 
the Medicode stock for plaintiff. In return, plaintiff agreed to 
immediately transfer to defendant the stock certificates and to 
forego his right to sue for defendant's breach of the original 
agreement. 
At trial, both parties agreed that plaintiff would not have 
transferred the stock certificates- to defendant had the second 
agreement not been entered into. Further, both plaintiff and 
defendant testified that at the May meeting both believed that 
money was still owing under the original contract. 
In December 1992, pursuant to the second agreement, 
plaintiff made a demand for the two percent Medicode stock that 
defendant was purportedly holding in trust for him. Defendant, 
however, refused to produce the stock, contending that the two 
percent agreement was meant only to secure defendant's payment of 
the additional $25,000. Plaintiff therefore sued defendant for 
breach of the two percent agreement. Prior to trial, defendant 
discovered additional business records which defendant claimed 
documented that, before entering into the second agreement, he 
had actually overpaid plaintiff for the purchase of the Medicode 
stock. 
A bench trial was held on March 22, 1994. The court railed 
that plaintiff could not enforce the second agreement as an 
accord and satisfaction because it was not supported by 
consideration and because it was based upon a mutual mistake that 
defendant owed additional money on the original agreement. The 
trial court therefore dismissed plaintiff's complaint and entered 
Q A c\c n r n-A 
judgment in favor of defendant based upon his "counterclaim" 
alleging that, at the time the second agreement was entered, 
defendant had already overpaid plaintiff for the Medicode stock. 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
It is settled that 
rl
 [a] n accord and satisfaction arises when the 
parties to a contract: mutually agree that a 
performance different than that required by 
the original contract will be made in 
substitution of the performance originally 
agreed upon and that the substituted 
agreement calling for a different performance 
will discharge the obligation created under 
the original agreement." 
Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp, v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 
1197 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Tebbs, Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 
735 P.2d 1305, 1307 (Utah 1986)) . Moreover, for an accord and 
satisfaction to have any legal effect, the elements of a 
contract, including consideration, must be present. Id. at 1197-
98. The elements of an accord and satisfaction include: 
(i) a bona fide dispute [or uncertainty] over 
an unliquidated amount; (ii) a payment 
tendered in full settlement of the entire 
dispute; and (iii) an acceptance of the 
payment. 
Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain 
States Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992) (citing 
Mart on Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607, 609 (Utah 1985}); 
accord Neiderhauser, 824 P.2d at 1197-98. 
A. Consideration2 
In its first claim of error, plaintiff contends the trial 
court erred when it concluded the second agreement did not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction because there was no 
2. Defendant alleges that plaintiff should be precluded from 
raising this issue on appeal because it was not raised at trial. 
A careful review of the record, however, reveals that whether the 
second agreement was predicated on sufficient consideration was, 
in fact, raised by plaintiff at trial. More significantly, 
consideration formed one basis for the trial court's 
determination that the accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. 
Q/in^:Qc_P7\ 
consideration to support that agreement. In Utah, it is clear 
that consideration for an accord may consist of a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute or uncertainty as to the amount actually owing. 
See, e.g., Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 730, 733 
(Utah 1985) (holding sufficient consideration exists when 
creditor agrees to accept lesser amount than is due where bona 
fide dispute as to amount is present) ; Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980) (stating where 
underlying claim is uncertain, assent to definite payment amounts 
to sufficient consideration) ; accord In re Estate of Grimm, 784 
P.2d 1238, 1244 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 752 P.2d 1138 
(Utah 1990). Moreover, " [i] t is not necessary for the dispute 
[or uncertainty] to be well-founded so long as it is in good 
faith.'1 Golden Key, 699 P. 2d at 733/ see also Ashton v. Skeen, 
85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073, 1076 (1935). 
Thus, if the parties in good faith believe there is a 
disputed or uncertain claim, mere settlement of the amount due 
and acceptance of that amount constitutes the consideration 
necessary to support the contract. Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 
326; accord Golden Key, 699 P.2d at 733/ Ashton, 39 P.2d at 1076, 
In the instant case, plaintiff received several checks from 
defendant in partial satisfaction of the original agreement over 
a nine month period. Plaintiff believed defendant still owed 
between $25,000 and $75,000 on the original purchase agreement. 
When the parties met at defendant's request in May 1391, 
plaintiff informed defendant of the amount he believed was then 
due and offered to settle the original contract for an additional 
$25,000 and two percent of the Medicode stock. Defendant did not 
dispute this claim, as he was equally unsure of the amount then 
owing on the original purchase agreement. Rather, he accepted 
the proposal in the interest of resolving the matter. 
At that meeting, defendant was interested in getting the 
stock certificates and plaintiff was interested in getting paid 
the full purchase price. Although unfounded, plaintiff asserted 
in good faith that he believed additional money was still owing. 
Defendant accepted this representation without dispute and 
accepted plaintiff's resolution proposal. The May 1991 agreement 
reflects the parties' good faith bargain regarding an uncertain 
claim. We conclude the trial court erred when it determined the 
second agreement was not supported by consideration and was 
therefore unenforceable.3 
3. Moreover, we note that courts have found that forbearance to 
prosecute a legally enforceable claim or to perform an act which 
one is not otherwise legally bound to perform provides sufficient 
consideration. Safety Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Thurston, 648 
(continued...) 
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B. Mutual Mistake 
Plaintiff further claims the trial court erred when it held 
that because neither party was aware that defendant had already 
paid the original purchase agreement in full, a mutual mistake of 
fact precluded the enforcement of the accord and satisfaction. 
An accord and satisfaction based upon a mutual mistake as to 
a material fact can be rescinded by either party. Deibel v. 
Kreiss, 50 N.E.2d 1000, 1002 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); 6 Arthur L. 
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1292, at 178 (1962). " XA mutual 
mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which they based their bargain. ' " Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 
254, 258 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 
666, 669 (Utah App. 1992)). Thus, an accord and satisfaction may 
be rescinded where there is a mutual mistake as to the bargain 
giving rise to the accord. 
Accepting the facts as found by the trial court, at the May 
1991 meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken that additional 
money was owed under the original agreement. However, this 
mistake did not go to the terms of the parties' accord; rather, 
it merely demonstrates their accord was indeed a compromise of a 
bona fide dispute which was not necessarily well-founded, but was 
made in good faith. See In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 
1244 (Utah App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
In the instant case, both parties were uncertain as to the 
amount that remained owing on the original contract when they 
entered into their agreement. Although mistaken as to whether 
money was then owing, the parties were clearly not mistaken as to 
the agreement they reached to compromise a good faith, though 
mistaken, claim. The accord and satisfaction accurately reflects 
the intent of the parties at the time it was entered. There was 
3. ( ...continued) 
P.2d 267, 270 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); accord Sugarhouse Fin. Co. v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980); Long v. Forbes, 136 
P.2d 242, 246-47 (Wyo. 1943). Thus, ,Mthe giving of further time 
for the payment of an existing debt by a valid agreement, for any 
period however short, . . . is a valuable consideration, and is 
sufficient to support'" a contract. Farmers & Merchants State 
Bank v. Higgins, 89 P.2d 916, 917 (Kan. 1939) (citation omitted); 
accord Sucrarhouse Fin. , 610 P.2d at 1372. 
In the instant case, although the entire debt was to be paid 
within the first quarter of 1990, plaintiff extended payment 
through 19 91. 
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therefore no mistake regarding a basic assumption underlying the 
accord and satisfaction, thus, in is not void.4 
Because we conclude the trial court erred when it held the 
accord and satisfaction unenforceable for lack of consideration 
and because we conclude the agreement was not founded upon a 
mutual mistake of fact, we reverse and remand for further action 
consistent with this opinion. 
L&r. yn- SLteiftJ W / V 
Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K.^orme, fcfing Judge 
if/ ,s'V #) &S * 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
4. To illustrate the difference between a bona fide uncertainty 
which is compromised by an accord and satisfaction from a mutual 
mistake going to the essence of the accord, the following example 
is helpful. If, in this case, the parties had agreed to exchange 
$25,000 for 258,363 shares of stock which both parties believed 
was transferable and it was then discovered the stock was not 
transferable, a mutual mistake as to the essence of the accord 
and satisfaction would be present. Under such a scenario, the 
mistake--that the stock was transferable--goes directly to a 
basic assumption underlying the substitute agreement and 
therefore constitutes a mutual mistake which voids that 
agreement. In the instant case, the parties were mistaken as to 
facts relevant to the original contract--whether money was then 
due and owing--not as to a term underlying the accord and 
satisfaction. 
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the remittitur of the court shall issue five days after the entry of the order 
disposing of the petition. 
(2"1 In the Court of Appeals the remittitur of the court snail issue imme-
diately after the expiration of the time for Sling a petition for writ of 
IllGwlCn ILL Ll-wli i3_ic;- -^c^ / ~ s ZL.c -~ — ull^ .L r v i c ~,-ng v O ^ o , J 
shall shcv that a motion in ihs cc^rl, rendering the decision is not practicable, 
or that the court rendering the decision has denied such a motion cr has failed 
to afford the relief ~-hich the movant requested, with the reasons given by the 
court rendering the decision for its action. Reasonable notice of the motion 
shall be given to ail parties. The period of the stay, supersedeas or injunction 
shall be for such time as ordered by the ccurt up to and including the final 
disposition of the application for review. If che stay, supersedeas, or injunction 
is granted until the final disposition of the application for review, the party 
seeking the review shall, within the time permitted for seeking the review, 
file with the clerk of the ccurt which entered the decision sought to be re-
viewed, a certified copy cf the notice of appeal, petition for writ of certiorari, or 
other application for review, or shall file a certificate that such application for 
review has been filed. Upon the filing of a copy cf an order of the reviewing 
court dismissing the appeal or denying the petition for a writ of certiorari, the 
remittitur shall issue immediately. A bond or other security on such terms as 
the court deems appropriate may be required a3 a condition to the grant or 
continuance of relief under this paragraph. 
(Amended effective October 1. 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Counsel the Court of Appeals or within five days of the 
should note that the petition for certiorari entry of a decision regarding a motion for re-
alone is not sufficient to stay the judgment of hearing. 
the Court of Appeals. Counsel must also file a Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
motion to stay the remittitur-or-fox-an mjunc- ^ ^
 Q c t o b e r i S 9 2 8 u b d i v i d e d 
tion or sunersedeas. Although the time ior til-
 n ,,;: . . . N , , . ' ' _ 
ing the petition for writ of certiorari is 30 days Subdivision (a), adding Jin the Supreme 
from the entry cf the decision of the Court of Co^ to t h e beginning of Subdivision (1) and 
Appeals, the motion for the stay muBt be filed adding Subdivision (2). 
within 14 days cf the entry of the decision of 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Palmer, 802 F.2d 743 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 886 et 
Error §§ 939 to 945. seq. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=* 1140. 
Rule 37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal. 
(a) Suggestion of mootness. It is the duty of each party at all times dur-
ing the course of an appeal to inform the court of any circumstances which 
have transpired subsequent to the filing of the appeal which render moot one 
or more of the issues raised. If a party determines that one or more issues 
have been rendered moot, the party shall forthwith advise the court by filing a 
"suggestion of mootness" in the form of a motion under Rule 23. If the parties 
to the appeal agree as to the mootness of an issue, a stipulation to that effect 
should be filed, and unless otherwise directed by the court, the appeal will 
then proceed as to the remaining issues; if all issues in the appeal are mooted 
and the parties stipulate thereto, the suggestion of mootness shall be pre-
sented to the court pursuant to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this rule. 
(b) Voluntary dismissal. If the parties to an appeal or other proceeding 
shall sign and file with the clerk an agreement that the proceeding be dis-
missed, specifying the terms as to payment of costs and shall pay whatever 
fees are due, the clerk shall enter an order of dismissal, unless otherwise 
directed by the ccurt. An appeal may be dismissed on motion of the appellant 
upon such terms as ma3~ be agreed upon by the parties or fixed by the court. 
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Lan C. England, LS!i^..lZZj 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Eugene Horbach, and Medicode 
Incorporated, and Does 
I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees 
NOV 2 2 1995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
-! REMITTITUR 
Case No. 940695-CA 
FILED OISTRO COURT 
Third Judicial District 
nrn o t IQQS 
By. S_Q Vyo-iputyCJeri 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, and the OPINION 
having been issued, the matter is hereby remitted. 
This 22nd day of November, 1995. 
Opinion Issued: October 19, 1995 
1 Volume, 2 Envelopes (Exhibits) , \ Transcripts. >QMO 
Record: 
1 CERTIFY 
CH'GiNAL 
DISTRICT . 
OF UTAH/g 
CVTE:_ / | 
COPY OF AN 
THIRD 
STATE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the November 22, 1995, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was deposited in the 
United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Samuel D. McVey 
Randy T. Austin 
Kirton & McConkie, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law for Appellant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
6 0 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Steven E. McCowin 
Wesley D. Felix 
Giauque, Crockett, Bendinger & Peterson 
Attorneys at Law for Appellee 
170 South Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Steven L. Taylor 
Attorney at Law for Appellee 
124 South 600 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 22nd day of November, 1995. 
BY , 
)eputy (£Ierk 
Case No. 940695-CA 
TRIAL COURT: Third District Court, SL County #930901471 CV 
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OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
P O. BOX 25060 
SANTA ANA, CA 92799 
ATTN: QUALITY CONTROL 
Loan Number* 011012535 
Servicing Number: 928275-7 
-MAU M996- M ^ -
_f Space Above This line For Rcconfing DataL 
DEED OF TRUST 
THIS DEED OF TRUST ("Security InstrumentB) is made on May 24 , 1996 
LAN C. ENGLAND, A MARRIED MAN AS HIS SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY 
The trustor is 
("Borrower"). 
The trustee is F IRST AMERICAN TITLB OF UTAH 
("Trustee"). The beneficiary is OPTION ONE MORTGAGE CORPORATION, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 
which is organized and existing under the laws of CALIFORNIA and whose address is 
2 02 0 EAST FIRST STREET SUITE 1 0 0 , SANTA ANA, CA 92 7 0 5 ("Lender"). 
Borrower owes Lender the principal sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND 
. . . AND NO/lOOTHs Dollars (U S. $500 ,000 .00 ). 
This debt is evidenced by Borrower's note dated the same date as this Secunty Instrument ("Note"), which provides for monthly 
payments, with the full debt, if not paid earlier, due and payable on June 01 , 2026 . This Security 
Instrument secures to Lender: (a) the repayment of the debt evidenced by the Note, with inteiest, and all renewals, extensions 
and modifications of the Note; (b) the payment of all other sums, with interest, advanced under paragraph 7 to protect the security 
of this Secunty Instrument; and (c) the performance of Borrower's covenants and agreements under this Security Instrument and 
the Note. For this purpose. Borrower irrevocably grants and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, the following 
described property located in S a l t Lake County, Utah: 
LOTS 1 THROUGH 8, INCLUSIVE, OF BLOCK 3, GENEVA PLACE, ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT 
THEREOF, FILED IN BOOK C OF PLATS, AT PAGE 90 OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY 
RECORDER. 
which has the address of 
Utah 84107 
[Zip Code) 
2 1 5 7 SOUTH LINCOLN STREET, 
("Property Address"); 
SALT LAKE CITY [Street, City), 
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or hereafter erected on the property, and all easements, appurtenances, 
and fixtures now or hereafter a part of the property All replacements and additions shall also be covered by this Security 
Instrument. All of the foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as the "Property." 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed and has the right to grant 
and convey the Property and that the Property is unencumbered, except for encumbrances of record. Borrower warrants and wdl 
defend generally the title to the Property against all claims and demands, subject to any encumbrances of record. 
COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Payment of Principal and Interest; Prepayment and Late Charges. Borrower shall promptly pay when due the principal 
of and interest on the debt evidenced by the Note and any prepayment and late charges due under the Note. 
Init Init. Init. Init 
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2. Funds for Taxes and Insurance. Subject to applicable law or to a written waiver by Lender, Borrower shall pay to 
Lender on the day monthly payments are due under the Note, until the Note is paid in full, a sum ("Funds") for: (a) yearly taxes 
and assessments which may attain priority over this Security Instrument as a lien on the Property; (b) yearly leasehold payments 
or ground rents on the Property, if any; (c) yearly hazard or property insurance premiums; (d) yearly flood insurance premiums, 
if any; (e) yearly mortgage insurance premiums, if any; and (0 any sums payable by Borrower to Lender, in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 8, m lieu of the payment of mortgage insurance premiums. These items are called "Escrow hems.'' Lender 
may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the maximum amount a lender for a federally related mortgage 
loan may require for Borrower's escrow account under the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 as amended from 
time to time, 12 U.S.C. Section 2601 et seq. ("RESPA"), unless another law that applies to the Funds sets a lesser amount. If so, 
Lender may, at any time, collect and hold Funds in an amount not to exceed the lesser amount. Lender may estimate the amount 
of Funds due on the basis of current data and reasonable estimates of expenditures of future Escrow Items or otherwise m 
accordance with applicable law. 
The Funds shall be held in an institution whose deposits are insured by a federal agency, instrumentality, or entity 
(including Lender, if Lender is such an institution) or in any Federal Home Loan Bank. Lender shall apply the Funds to pay the 
Escrow Items. Lender may not charge Borrower for holding and applying the Funds, annually analyzing the escrow account, or 
verifying the Escrow Items, unless Lender pays Borrower interest on the Funds and applicable law permits Lender to make such 
a charge. However, Lender may require Borrower to pay a one-time charge for an independent real estate tax reporting service used 
by Lender in connection with this loan unless applicable law provides otherwise. Unless an agreement is made or applicable law 
requires interest to be paid, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any interest or earnings on the Funds. Borrower and 
Lender may agree in writing, however, that interest shall be paid on the Funds. Lender shall give to Borrower, without charge, 
an annual accounting of the Funds, showing credits and debits to the Funds and the purpose for which each debit to the Funds was 
made. The Funds are pledged as additional security for all sums secured by this Security Instrument. 
If the Funds held by Lender exceed the amounts permitted to be held by law, Lender shall account to Borrower for the 
excess Funds in accordance with the requirements of applicable law. If the amount of the Funds held by Lender at any time is not 
sufficient to pay the Escrow Items when due, Lender may so notify Borrower in writing, and, in such case Borrower shall pay to 
Lender the amount necessary to make up the deficiency. Borrower shall make up the deficiency in no more than twelve monthly 
payments, at Lender's sole discretion. 
Upon payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall promptly refund to Borrower any Funds 
held by Lender. If, under paragraph 21 , Lender shall acquire or sell the Property, Lender, prior to the acquisition or sale of the 
Property, shall apply any Funds held by Lender at the time of acquisition or sale as a credit against the sums secured by this 
Security Instrument. 
3. Application of Payments. Unless applicable law provides otherwise, all payments received by Lender under paragraphs 
1 and 2 shall be applied: first, to any prepayment charges due under the Note; second, to amounts payable under paragraph 2; third, 
to interest due; fourth, to principal due; and last, to any late charges due under the Note. 
4. Charges; Liens. Borrower shall pay all taxes, assessments, charges, fines and impositions attributable to the Property 
which may attain priority over this Security Instrument, and leasehold payments or ground rents, if any. Borrower shall pay these 
obligations in the manner provided in paragraph 2, or if not paid in that manner, Borrower shall pay them on time directly to the 
person owed payment. Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender all notices of amounts to be paid under this paragraph. If 
Borrower makes these payments directly, Borrower shall promptly furnish to Lender receipts evidencing the payments. 
Borrower shall promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this Security Instrument unless Borrower: (a) agrees 
in writing to the payment of the obligation secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to Lender; (b) contests in good faith the lien 
by, or defends against enforcement of the lien in, legal proceedings which in the Lender's opinion operate to prevent the 
enforcement of the lien; or (c) secures from the holder of the lien an agreement satisfactory to Lender subordinating the lien to this 
Security Instrument. If Lender determines that any part of the Property is subject to a lien which may attain priority over this 
Security Instrument, Lender may give Borrower a notice identifying the lien. Borrower shall satisfy the lien or take one or more 
of the actions set forth above within 10 days of the giving of notice. 
5. Hazard or Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now existing or hereafter erected on the Property 
insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term "extended coverage" and any other hazards, including floods or 
flooding, for which Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the amounts and for the periods that Lender 
requires. The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's approval which shall not 
be unreasonably withheld. If Borrower fails to maintain coverage described above, Lender may, at Lender's option, obtain coverage 
to protect Lender's rights in the Property in accordance with paragraph 7'. 
All insurance policies and renewals shall be acceptable to Lender and shall include a standard mortgage clause. Lender shall 
have the right to hold the policies and renewals. If Lender requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid 
premiums and renewal notices. In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the insurance carrier and Lender. Lender 
may make proof of loss if not made promptly by Borrower. 
Vnltss Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, or applicable law otherwise requires, insurance proceeds shall 
be applied first to reimburse Lender for costs and expenses incurred in connection with obtaining any such insurance proceeds, and 
then, at discretion, and regardless of any impairment of security or lack thereof: (i) to the sums secured may determine in its sole 
and absolute discretion; and/or (ii) to Borrower to pay the costs and expenses of necessary repairs or restoration of the Property 
to a condition satisfactory to Lender. If Borrower abandons the Property, or does not answer within 30 days a notice from Lender 
that the insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, Lender may collect the insurance proceeds. Lender may, in its sole and 
absolute discretion, and regardless of any impairment of security or lack thereof, use the proceeds to repair or restore the Property 
or to pay the sums secured by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due. The 30-day period will begin when the notice is 
given. 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or 
postpone die due date of the monthly payments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount of the payments. If under 
paragraph 21 the Property is acquired by Lender, Borrower's right to any insurance policies and proceeds resulting from damage 
to the Property prior to ihe acquisition shall pass to Lender to the extent of the sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately 
prior to the acquisition. 
l n i l , ^ L 0 IniL IniL IniL IniL ]nJL 
P a 8 c 2 of 6 UTD10012 (04-25-96) 
If Borrower obtains earthquake insurance, any other hazard insurance, or any other msurance on the Property and such 
insurance is not specifically required by Lender then such insurance shall (1) name Lender as loss payee thereunder, and (n) be 
subject to the provisions of this paragraph 5 
6 Preservation, Maintenance and Protection of the Property; Borrower's Loan Application, Leaseholds Borrower shall 
not destroy damage or impair the Property allow the Property to deteriorate or commit waste on the Property Borrower shall 
be in default if any forfeiture action or proceeding, whether civd or criminal, is begun that in Lender s good faith judgment could 
result in forfeiture of the Property or otherwise materially impair the hen created by this Security Instrument or Lender s security 
interest Borrower may cure such a default and reinstate, as provided in paragraph 18 by causing the action or proceeding to be 
dismissed wiih a ruling that in Lender s good faith determination precludes forfeiture of the Borrower s interest in the Property 
or other material impairment of the hen created by this Security Instrument or Lender s security interest Borrower shall also be 
in default if Borrower during the loan application process, gave materially false or inaccurate information or statements to Lender 
(or failed to provide Lender with any material information) m connection with the loan evidenced by the Note, including, but not 
limited to representations concerning Borrower s occupancy of the Property as a principal residence If this Security Instrument 
is on a leasehold, Borrower shall comply with all the provisions of the lease If Borrower acquires fee title to the Property, the 
leasehold and the fee title shall not merge unless Lender agrees to the merger in writing 
Borrower shall at Borrower s own expense, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the Property 
or any portion thereof or Borrower s title thereto, the validity or priority of the lien created by this Security instrument, or the rights 
or powers of Lender or Trustee with respect to this Security Instrument or the Property All causes of action of Borrower, whether 
accrued before or after the date of this Security Instrument, for damage or injury to the Property or any part thereof, or m 
connection with any transaction financed m whole or m part by the proceeds of the Note or any other note secured by this Security 
Instrument by Lender or in connection with or affecting the Property or any part thereof, including causes of action arising in tort 
or contract and causes of action for fraud or concealment of a material fact, are, at Lender's option, assigned to Lender, and the 
proceeds thereof shall be paid directly to Lender who, after deductmg therefrom all its expenses, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees, may apply such proceeds to the sums secured by this Security Instrument or to any deficiency under this Security Instrument 
or may release any monies so received by it or any part thereof, as Lender may elect Lender may, at its option, appear in and 
prosecute in its own name any action or proceeding to enforce any such cause of action and may make any compromise or 
settlement thereof Borrower agrees to execute such further assignments and any other instruments as from time to time may be 
necessary to effectuate the foregoing provisions and as Lender shall request 
7 Protection of Lender's Rights m the Property If Borrower fails to perform the covenants and agreements contained in 
mis Security Instrument, or there is a legal proceeding that may significantly affect Lender's rights in the Property (such as a 
proceeding in bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture or to enforce laws or regulations), then Lender may do and pay 
for whatever is necessary to protect the value of the Property and Lender's rights in the Property Lender's actions may include 
paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument, appearing m court, paying reasonable attorneys' 
fees and entering on the Property to make repairs Although Lender may take action under this paragraph 7, Lender does not have 
to do so 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this paragraph 7 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security 
Instrument Unless Borrower and Lender agree to other terms of payment, these amounts shall bear interest from the date of 
disbursement at the Note rate in effect from time to time and shall be payable, with interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower 
requesting payment 
8 Mortgage Insurance If Lender required mortgage insurance as a condition of making the loan secured by this Security 
Instrument Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain the mortgage insurance in effect If, for any reason, the mortgage 
insurance coverage required by Lender lapses or ceases to be in effect, Borrower shall pay the premiums required to obtain coverage 
substantially equivalent to the mortgage msurance previously in effect, at a cost substantially equivalent to the cost to Borrower of 
the mortgage insurance previously m effect, from an alternate mortgage insurer approved by Lender If substantially equivalent 
mortgage insurance coverage is not available, Borrower shall pay to Lender each month a sum equal to one twelfth of die yearly 
mortgage insurance premium being paid by Borrower when the insurance coverage lapsed or ceased to be in effect Lender will 
accept, use and retain these payments as a loss reserve in lieu of mortgage insurance Loss reserve payments may no longer be 
required, at the option of Lender, if mortgage msurance coverage (in the amount and for the period that Lender requires) provided 
by an insurer approved by Lender again becomes available and is obtained Borrower shall pay the premiums required to maintain 
mortgage msurance in effect or to provide a loss reserve, until the requirement for mortgage insurance ends in accordance with 
any written agreement between Borrower and Lender or applicable law 
9 Inspection Lender or its agent may make reasonable entries upon and inspections of the Property Lender shall give 
Borrower notice at the time of or prior to an inspection specifying reasonable cause for the inspection 
10 Condemnation. The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection with any 
condemnation or other taking of any part of the Property, or for conveyance in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall 
be paid to Lender Lender may apply, use or release the condemnation proceeds in the same manner as provided in paragraph 5 
hereof with respect to insurance proceeds 
If the Property is abandoned by Borrower, or if, after notice by Lender to Borrower that the condemnor offers to make 
an award or settle a claim for damages, Borrower fails to respond to Lender within 30 days after the date the notice is given, Lender 
is authorized to collect and apply the proceeds, at its option, either to restoration or repair of the Property or to the sums secured 
by this Security Instrument, whether or not then due 
Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree m writing, any application of proceeds to principal shall not extend or 
postpone the due date of the monthly payments referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 or change the amount of such payments 
11 Borrower Not Released, Forbearance By Lender Not a Waiver Extension of the time for payment or modification of 
amortization of the sums secured by this Security Instrument granted by Lender to any successor in interest of Borrower shall not 
operate to release the liability of the original Borrower or Borrower s successor m interest Lender shall not be required to 
commence proceedings against any successor in interest or reruse to extend time for payment or otherwise modify amortization of 
the suras secured by this Security Instrument by reason of any demand made by the original Borrower or Borrower's successors 
in interest Any forbearance by Lender in exercising any right or remedy shall not be a waiver of or preclude the exercise of any 
right or remedy 
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12 Successors and Assigns Bound, Joint and Several Liability, Co-signers The covenants and agreements of this Security 
Instrument shall bind and benefit ihe successors and assigns of Lender and Borrower, subject to the provisions of paragraph 17 
Borrower s covenants and agreements shall be joint and several Any Borrower who co signs this Security Instrument but does not 
execute the Note (a) is co signing this Security Instrument only to mortgage, grant and convey that Borrower s interest in the 
Property under the terms of this Security Instrument, (b) is not personally obligated to pay the sums secured by this Security 
Instrument and (c) agrees that Lender and any other Borrower may agree to extend, modify, forbear or make any accommodations 
with regard to the terms of this Security Instrument or the Note without that Borrower' s consent 
13 Loan Charges If the loan secured by this Security Instrument is subject to a law which sets maximum loan charges, 
and that law is finally interpreted so that the interest or other loan charges collected or to be collected in connection with the loan 
exceed the permitted limits, then (a) any such loan charge shall be reduced by the amoum necessary to reduce the charge to the 
permitted limit, and (b) any sums already collected from Borrower which exceeded permitted limits will be refunded to Borrower 
Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower 
If a refund reduces principal, ihe reduction will be treated as a partial prepayment without any prepayment charge under the Note 
14 Notices Any notice to Borrower provided for in this Security Instrument shall be given by delivering it or by mailing 
it by first class mail unless applicable law requires use of another method The notice shall be directed to the Property Address or 
any other address Borrower designates by notice to Lender Any notice to Lender shall be given by first class mail to Lender s 
address stated herein or any other address Lender designates by notice to Borrower Any notice provided for in this Security 
Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given as provided in this paragraph 
15 Governing Law, Severability This Security Instrument shall be governed by federal law and the law of the jurisdiction 
m which the Property is located In the event that any provision or clause of this Security Instrument or the Note conflicts with 
applicable law such conflict shall not affect other provisions of this Security Instrument or the Note which can be given effect 
without the conflicting provision To this end the provisions of this Security Instrument and the Note are declared to be severable 
16 Borrower's Copy Borrower shall be given one conformed copy of the Note and of this Security Instrument 
17 Transfer of the Property or a Beneficial Interest in Borrower If all or any part of the Property or any interest m it is 
sold or transferred (or if a beneficial interest in Borrower is sold or transferred and Borrower is not a natural person) without 
Lender s prior written consent, Lender may at its option, require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security 
Instrument However this option shall not be exercised by Lender if exercise is prohibited by federal law as of the date of this 
Security Instrument 
If Lender exercises dns option, Lender shall give Borrower notice of acceleration The notice shall provide a penod of not 
less man 30 days from the date the notice is delivered or mailed within which Borrower must pay ail sums secured by this Security 
Instrument If Borrower fails to pay these sums pnor to the expiration of dns penod, Lender may invoke any remedies permitted 
by this Security Instrument without further notice or demand on Borrower 
18 Borrower's Right to Remstate If Borrower meets certain conditions, Borrower shall have the right to have enforcement 
of this Security Instrument discontinued at any time pnor to the earlier of (a) 5 days (or such other penod as applicable law may 
specify for reinstatement) before sale of the Property pursuant to any power of sale contained in this Security Instrument or (b) 
entry of a judgment enforcing this Secunty Instrument Those conditions are that Borrower (a) pays Lender all sums which then 
would be due under this Secunty Instrument and the Note as if no acceleration had occurred; (b) cures any default of any other 
covenants or agreements, (c) pays all expenses incurred in enforcing this Security Instrument, including, but not limited to, 
reasonable attorneys fees, and (d) takes such iction as Lender may reasonably require to assure that the lien of this Security 
Instrument, Lender's rights in the Property and Borrower s obligation to pay the sums secured by this Secunty Instrument shall 
continue unchanged Upon reinstatement by Borrower, this Security Instrument and the obligations secured hereby shall remain fully 
effective as if no acceleration had occurred However, this nght to reinstate shall not apply in the case of acceleration under 
paragraph 17 
19 Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer The Note or a partial interest m the Note (together with this Secunty 
Instrument) may be sold one or more times without pnor notice to Borrower A sale may result m a change in the entity (known 
as the "Loan Servicer") that collects monthly payments due under the Note and this Secunty Instrument There also may be one 
or more changes of the Loan Servicer unrelated to a sale of the Note If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, Borrower will be 
given wntten notice of the change in accordance with paragraph 14 above- and applicable law The notice will state the name and 
address of the new Loan Servicer and address to which payments should bemade The notice will also contain any other information 
required by applicable law The holder of the Note and this Security Instrument shall be deemed to be the Lender hereunder 
20 Hazardous Substances. Borrower shall not cause or permit the presence, use, disposal, storage, or release of any 
Hazardous Substances on or in the Property Borrower shall not do, nor allow anyone else to do, anything affecting the Property 
diat is in violation of any Environmental Law The preceding two sentences shall not apply to the presence, use, or storage on the 
Property of small quantities of Hazardous Substances that are generally recognized to be appropnate to normal residential uses and 
to maintenance of the Property 
Borrower shall promptly give Lender wntten notice of any investigation, claim, demand, lawsuit or other action by any 
governmental or regulatory agency or private party involving the Property and any Hazardous Substance or Environmental Law 
of which Borrower has actual knowledge If Borrower learns, or is notified by any governmental or regulatory authority, that any 
removal or other remediation of any Hazardous Substance affecting the Property is necessary, Borrower shall promptly take all 
necessary remedial actions in accordance with Environmental Law 
Borrower shall be solely responsible for shall indemnify, defend and hold harmless Lender, its directors, officers, 
employees, attorneys, agents, and their respective successors and assigns, from and against any and all claims, demands, causes 
of action, loss, damage, cost (including actual attorneys' fees and court costs and costs of any required or necessary repair, cleanup 
or detoxification of the Property and the preparation and implementation of any closure, abatement, containment, remedial or other 
required plan), expenses and liability directly or indirectly ansmg out or or attnbutable to (a) the use, generation, storage, release, 
threatened release discharge, disposal, abatement or presence of Hazardous Substances on, under or about the Property (b) the 
transport to or from the Property of any Hazardous Substances (c) die violation of any Hazardous Substances law and (d) any 
Hazardous Substances claims 
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As used in (his paragraph 20, "Hazardous Substances' are those substances defined as toxic or hazardous substances by 
Environmental Law and the following substances gasoline, kerosene, other flammable or toxic petroleum products, toxic pesticides 
and herbicides, volatile solvents, materials containing asbestos or formaldehyde, and radioactive materials As used in this paragraph 
20, Environmental Law" means federal laws and laws of tbe jurisdiction where the Property is located that relate to health, safety 
or environmental protection 
ADDITIONAL COVENANTS Borrower and Lender further covenant and agree as follows 
21 Acceleration, Remedies If any installment under the Note or notes secured hereby is not paid when due, or if Borrower 
should be in default under any provision of this Security Instrument, of if Borrower is in default under any other deed of trust or 
other instrument secured by the Property, aU sums secured by this Security InstrumeDt and accrued interest thereon shall at once 
become due and payable at the option of Lender without prior notice, except as otherwise required by applicable law, and regardless 
of any prior forbearance In such event, Lender, at its option, and subject to applicable law, may then or thereafter invoke the power 
of sale and/or any other remedies or take any other actions permitted by applicable law Lender will collect all expenses mcuned 
in pursuing the remedies described in this Paragraph 21, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of title 
evidence 
If the power of sale is invoked, Trustee shall execute a written notice of the occurrence of an event of default and of the 
election to cause tbe Property to be sold and shall record such notice in each county in which any part of the Property is located. 
Lender or Trustee shall mail copies of such notice in the manner prescribed by applicable law to Borrower and to the other persons 
prescribed by applicable law Trustee shall give public notice of the sale to the persons and in the manner prescribed by applicable 
law After the time required by applicable law, Trustee, without demand on Borrower, shall sell tbe Property at public auction to 
the highest bidder at the time and place and under the terms designated in the notice of sale in one or more parcels and in any order 
Trustee determines Trustee may in accordance with applicable law, postpone sale of all or any parcel of the Property by public 
announcement at the time and place of any previously scheduled sale Lender or its designee may purchase the Property at any sale. 
Trustee shall deliver to the purchaser Trustee's deed conveying the Property without any covenant or warranty, expressed 
or implied The recitals in the Trustee's deed shall be prima facie evidence of the truth of the statements made therein. Trustee shall 
apply the proceeds of the sale in the following order: (a) to all expenses of the sale, including, but not limited to, reasonable 
Trustee's and attorneys' fees, (b) to all sums secured by this Security histrument; and (c) any excess to the person or persons legally 
entitled to it or to the county clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
22 Reconveyance. Upon payment of all sums secured by this Security Instrument, Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey 
the Property and shall surrender this Security Instrument and all notes evidencing debt secured by this Security Instrument to 
Trustee Trustee shall reconvey the Property without warranty and without charge to the person or persons legally entitled to it 
Such person or persons shall pay any recordation costs. 
23. Substitute Trustee. Lender, at its option, may from time to time remove Trustee and appoint a successor imstee to any 
Trustee appointed hereunder Without conveyance of the Property, the successor trustee shall succeed to all the title, power and 
duties conferred upon Trustee herein and by applicable law 
24. Request for Notices Borrower requests that copies of the notices of default and sale be sent to Borrower's address 
which is tbe Property Address. 
25. Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure. Borrower has made certain written representation and disclosures in order to 
induce Lender to make the loan evidenced by the Note or notes which this Security Instrument secures, and in the event that 
Borrower has made any material misrepresentation or failed to disclose any material fact, Lender, at its option and without prior 
notice or demand, shall have the right to declare the indebtedness secured by this Security Instrument, irrespective of tbe maturity 
date specified in the Note or notes secured by this Security Instrument, immediately due and payable To the extent permitted by 
applicable law, Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Lender setting forth facts showing a default by Borrower 
under this paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein, and to act thereon hereunder 
26. Time is of the Essence. Time is of the essence in the performance of each provision of this Security Instrument. 
27. Waiver of Statute of I .imitations. The pleading of the statute of limitations as a defense to enforcement of this Security 
Instrument, or any and all obligations referred to herein or secured hereby, is hereby waived to the fullest extent permitted by 
applicable law 
28. Modification This Security Instrument may be modified or amended only by an agreement in writing signed by 
Borrower and Lender 
29. Reimbursement. To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall reimburse Trustee and Lender for any and 
all costs, fees and expenses which either may incur, expend or sustain in the execution of the trust created hereunder or in the 
performance of any act required or permitted hereunder or by law or in equity or otherwise arising out of or in connection with 
this Security Instrument, the Note, any other note secured by this Security Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower 
m connection with the Note or Security Instrument To the extent permitted by applicable law, Borrower shall pay to Trustee and 
Lender their fees in connection with Trustee and Lender providing documents or services arising out of or in connection with this 
Security Instrument, the Note, any other note secured by this Security Instrument or any other instrument executed by Borrower 
m connection with tbe Note or Security Instrument 
30 Clerical Error In the event Lender at any time discovers that the Note, any other note secured by this Security 
Instrument, the Security Instrument, or any other document or instrument executed in connection with the Security Instrument, Note 
or notes contains an error that was caused by a clerical mistake, calculation error, computer malfunction, printing error or similar 
error, Borrower agrees, upon notice from Lender, to reexecute any documents that are necessary to correct any such error(s). 
Borrower further agrees that Lender will not be liable to Borrower for any damages incurred by Borrower that axe directly or 
indirectly caused by any such error 
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31. Lost Stolen, Destroyed or Mutilated Security Instrnment and Other Documents. In the event of the loss, theft or 
destruction of the Note, any other note secured by this Secunty Instrument, the Secunty Instrument or any other documents or 
instruments executed in connection with the Secunty Instrument, Note or notes (collectively, the "Loan Documents"), upon 
Borrower's receipt of an indemnification executed in favor of Borrower by Lender, or, in the event of the mutilation of any of the 
Loan Documents, upon Lender's surrender to Borrower of the mutilated Loan Document, Borrower shall execute and deliver to 
Lender a Loan Document in form and content identical to, and to serve as a replacement of, the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated 
Loan Document, and such replacement shall have the same force and effect as the lost, stolen, destroyed, or mutilated Loan 
Documents, and may be treated for all purposes as the original copy of such Loan Document. 
32. Assignment of Rents. As additional security hereunder, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender the rents of the Property 
Borrower shall have the right to collect and retain the rents of the Property as they become due and payable provided Lender has 
not exercised its nghts to require immediate payment m full of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and Borrower has not 
abandoned the Property. 
33. Riders to this Security InstrnmenL If one or more riders are executed by Borrower and recorded together with this 
Security Instrument, the covenants and agreements of each such rider shall be incorporated into and shall amend and supplement 
the covenants and agreements of this Security Instrument as if the rider(s) were a part of this Security Instrument. 
[Check applicable box(es)] 
B Adjustable Rate Rider 
L J NO Prepayment Penalty Option Rider 
CD Others) (specify) 
LJ Condominium Rider 
LI Planned Unit Development Rider 
a 1-4 Family Rider 
12L) Occupancy Rider 
BY SIGNING BELOW, Borrower accepts and agrees to the terms and covenants contained in this Security Instrument and 
in any rider(s) executed by Borrower and recorded with it. 
Witnesses: 
JSeai) 
jSeaJ) 
-Borrower 
c. ENG: 
JSeaJ) 
Borrower 
JSeal) 
(Seal) 
-Borrower 
(Seal) 
-Borrower 
cif-ufe STATE OF UTAH, County ss 
The foregoing instrument was subscribed and sworn to and acknowledged before me diis Sy 
My Commission Expires: / y^l 
Wt 
NctaryPubto ~ * H 
WWJAMJACKMAJi 1 
IJMCMlWooSouth J 
8j*U*C»y.U!ahe412t I 
Notary ] 
ResioW>*r ^Z^C 
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his duty to disclose material facts to them, 
namely, the fact that he had committed mal-
practice, by producing Dr. Baughman's depo-
sition in which he states that he did not 
believe and does not believe that he commit-
ted malpractice 
Jensen and Hlpwell, however, as the non-
moving parties, utterly failed to meet their 
burden of coming forward with evidence to 
contradict Dr Baughman's deposition testi-
mony In their opposition to McKay-Dee's 
motion for summary judgment, Jensen and 
HipwelJ simply reiterate the allegations of 
their complaint and provide no support for 
their claim that Dr Baughman failed to feell 
thetn that Shelly had been "left to bleed 
internally for several hours before accurately 
diagnosing her illness " Dr Baughman's de-
position testimony specifically and directly 
challenges Jensen and Hipwell's assertion, 
and they failed to provide any evidence to 
support their claim Thus, the trial court 
correctly ruled that there was insufficient 
evidence to submit the matter to a jury. 
Because Jensen and Hipwell's claim of con-
structive fraud against McKay-Dee was in-
sufficiently supported by the evidence, such a 
claim cannot be used to toll the statute of 
limitations on their medical malpractice 
claims against McKay-Dee 
We remand to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion 
Lnn C. ENGLAND, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
E u g e n e HORBACH, an individual, Medi-
code, I n c , a Utah corporation, and Does 
I t h r o u g h V, Defendants and Peti t ion-
ers . 
No. 950506. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
May 30, 1997 
Rehearing Denied Aug 26, 1997 
Seller of stock sued buyer, seeking to 
enforce accord and satisfaction agreement 
under which buyer was to pay seller $25,000 
as final amount owed for shares The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, J Dennis 
Frederick, J , dismissed complaint on 
grounds that accord and satisfaction lacked 
consideration, and seller appealed The 
Court of Appeals, 905 P 2d 301, reversed and 
remanded Certiorari was granted The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that* (1) 
Court of Appeals erred by accepting trial 
court's fact finding that parties were mutual-
ly mistaken in concluding that $25,6*00 was 
owed on contract, and then determining that 
amount due was uncertain, as required for 
accord and satisfaction to apply, and (2) fail-
ure to object at trial precluded challenge to 
trial court'B allowance of counterclaim by 
buyer, alleging overpayment of $169,501.75. 
Court of Appeals' judgment reversed; 
trial court's judgment reinstated. 
1. Appeal and Er ror <s=>842(2), 1083(1) 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness, and like-
wise Supreme Court accords no particular 
deference to conclusions of law made by 
Court of Appeals, but reviews such conclu-
sions for correctness 
2. Appeal and Er ror <s=»1008.1(5) 
Court of Appeals may reverse factual 
finding of trial court only if it determines 
that finding is "clearly erroneous," that is, if 
trial court'B ruling contradicts great weight 
of evidence or if court reviewing evidence is 
left with definite and firm conviction that 
mistake has been made Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 52(a) 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other Judicial constructions and def-
initions 
3. Appeal and Error <£=*1094(1) 
Court of Appeals erred by purporting to 
accept trial court's factual determination that 
parties to sale of stock mistakenly believed 
that buyer owed 6eller an additional $25,000, 
and then concluding that parties were uncer-
ENGLAND r. HORBACH 
Cite M M4 P2d 340 (Utah 1997) 
tain as to amount owing on contract, so as to 
allow buyer's payment of $25,000 to seller to 
operate as accord and satisfaction; Court of 
Appeals was bound by trial court's factual 
determinations unless findings were "clearly 
erroneous/ and no such determination was 
made In present case Rules Civ Proc , Rule 
52(a) 
Utah 341 
4. Accord and Satisfaction <5S»10(1) 
Absence of uncertainty as to amount due 
under contract'for sale of shares of corpora-
tion precluded determination by court of ap-
peals that payment of $25,000 by buyer to 
seller was an accord and satisfaction; trial 
court found mutual mistake present, under 
which parties concluded with certainty, albeit 
mistakenly, that $25,000 of purchase price 
remained unpaid. 
5. Pleading «=»230(5) 
While trial court has only limited discre-
tion to grant amendment of pleadings to 
conform to evidence adduced at trial, as it 
must first find that presentation of merits of 
action will be subserved by amendment and 
that admission of evidence, In question would 
not prejudice adverse party in maintaining 
his action or defense on merits, thereafter 
trial court has full discretion to allow ah 
amendment of the pleadings; that is, it may 
grant or deny party's motion for amendment 
upon any reasonable basis, and court's deci-
sion can be reversed only if abuse of discre-
tion appears. Rules Civ Proc, Rule 15(b) 
6. Pleading <s~411 
Failure to object at trial precluded chal-
lenge to trial court's allowance during trial of 
counterclaim by buyer of stock, alleging he 
had overpaid by $169,501.75, after trial court 
found that agreement under which buyer was 
to pay seller an additional $25,000 was found-
ed on mutual mistake and was unenforceable 
Samuel D. McVey, Randy T Austin, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent 
Steven G. Crockett, Steven E. McCowin, 
Wesley D. Felix, Steven L. Taylor, Salt Lake 
City, for defendants and petitioners. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This case comes to us on a writ of certiora-
ri to the court of appeals, which held that the 
parties had reached an accord and satisfac-
tion of their dispute. We reverse 
In 1989, defendant Eugene Horbach orally 
agreed to buy 258,363 shares of Medicode 
stock from plaintiff Lan England at $2 75 per 
share, for a total purchase price of $710,-
498 25 Over the course of the next ten 
months, Horbach made several payments to 
England totaling $859,599 35 Taking into 
account a reimbursement of $4,599 35 for 
certain additional expenses that England had 
incurred on Horbach's behalf, by September 
14, 1990, Horbach had in fact overpaid Eng-
land by $144,501.75. 
Nevertheless, when the parties met again 
eight months later, on May 23, 1991, both 
were apparently under the mistaken impres-
sion that more money was owed on the origi-
nal contract. Horbach, because of errors he 
attributes to his accounting department, was 
uncertain of the amount then due England 
testified that he thought Horbach owed him 
an amount between $25,000 and $75,000 
But England also testified that he told Hor-
bach that the amount owed was $25,000 
Horbach believed England, and the trial 
court Tovnd that "at the May 23rd meeting 
both the Plaintiff and the Defendant mistak-
enly believed that $25,000 remained owing 
under the 19R9 stock purchase agreement" 
Consequently, on May 23, 1991, the parties 
came to an agreement (the "May 23 agree-
ment") whereby England delivered the 258,-
363 shares to Horbach and Horbach gave 
England a post-dated check for $25,000 along 
with a note promising to "hold 2% of Medi-
code stock in t rust for you (Englandl forever 
unless I have different instructions by you on 
disposition of that stock " But when Eng-
land later asked Horbach to reconvey the 
promised two percent of Medicode stock, 
Horbach reftised Horbach argued at trial 
that he meant to deliver only a security 
interest In the two percent to secure pay 
ment of the postdated check and that the 
language of the agreement was merely "an 
unfortunate choice of language," possibly re-
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suiting from the fact that "we had a few 
drinks at lunch." England brought an action 
in the Third District Court to recover the 
proceeds of the shares, which by stipulation 
of the parties had been sold for $869,140 60 
Horbach raised a counterclaim at the trial for 
recovery of $169,6df.75, the amount that he 
had overpaid on the original contract. 
The trial court found that the May 23 
agreement was executed under a mutual mis-
take of fact and was therefore unenforceable. 
Because Horbach had already overpaid Eng-
land by the time of the May 23 agreement, 
the court found that England had a preexist-
ing duty to deliver the shares to Horbach. 
The court therefore concluded that Hor-
bach's promise to give England an Interest In 
twu percent of the Medicode stock was with-
out consideration The court also granted 
Horbach's motion fof a counterclaim and 
awarded him a judgment against England in 
the amount of $169,601.75 for overpayments 
under the original contract. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial 
court England v Horbach, 905 P2d 301 
(Utah C tApp 1995). The court of appeals 
found that the May 23 agreement constituted 
an accord and satisfaction and found consid-
eration for the agreement in the bargained-
for settlement of the parties' uncertain 
claims. Id at 304. The court Stated that "if 
the parties in good faith believe there is a 
disputed or uncertain claim, mere settlement 
of the amount due and acceptance of that 
amount constitutes the consideration neces-
sary to support the contract " Id (citations 
omitted) As for the trial court's finding of 
mutual mistake, the court of appeals recog-
fi)7ed that "the parties were indeed mistaken 
thaf additional money was owed under the 
original agreement However," the court 
continued, "this mistake did not go to the 
terms of the parties' accord; rather it merely 
demonstrates their accord WRS Indeed a com-
promise of a bona fide dispute which WHS not 
necessarily well-founded, but was In good 
faith " Id at 305 (citations omitted) This 
court granted Horbach's'petition for certiora-
ri 913 P 2d 749 (Utah 1996). 
The petition foi certiorari and the briefs of 
the parties indicate that we must resolve at 
least three issues "We must first decide 
whether the court of appeals applied the 
correct standard of review and gave proper 
deference to the trial courf B findings of fact 
Next we must determine whether the May 23 
agreement was a compromise of an unsettled 
claim constituting an accord and satisfaction 
or merely the conclusion of the original con-
tract based on mistaken assumptions about 
the parties' legal obligations If the May 23 
agreement did in fact constitute an accord 
and satisfaction, we must also decide whether 
the parties' mutual mistake merely goes to 
the terms of the original agreement or 
whether it invalidates any further "accord" 
the parties may have reached on May 23. 
Finally, we must decide whether the trial 
court erred in granting Horbaeh'9 motion to 
amend his pleading to conform to the evi-
dence, thus allowing Horbach to counterclaim 
for overpayments to England in the amount 
of $169,501.75. 
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW BEFORE 
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND 
T H E SUPREME COURT 
[1,2] The court of appeals reviews the 
trial court's conclusions of law for correct-
ness, and likewise this court "accordOJ no 
particular deference to conclusions of law . 
made by the court of appeals, but re-
view[8] such conclusions for correctness." 
Landes v Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 
1129 (Utah 1990). The court of appeals may 
reverse a factual finding of the trial court 
only if it determines that the finding is 
"clearly erroneous," Utah R Civ P 52(a), 
that is, If the trial court's '"ruling contradicts 
the great weight of evidence or if a court 
reviewing the evidence is left with 'a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made ' " Sevy v Security Title Co, 902 P.2d 
629, 635 (Utah 1995) (quoting State v Walk-
er, 743 P 2 d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This 
court must determine in its turn "whether 
the court of appeals correctly decided that 
the trial court's ruling on this Issue was 
clearly erroneous." Id. 
[3] Horbach argues that the court of ap-
peals improperly set aside the trial court's 
finding of fact 11, in which the trial court 
states, "The Court finds that at the May 23rd 
meeting both the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
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mistakenly believed that $25,000 remained 
owing under the 1989 stock purchase agree-
ment." In fact, the court of appeals accepted 
the trial court's finding that "at the May 1991 
meeting, the parties were indeed mistaken 
that additional money was owed under the 
original agreement" England, 905 P 2d at 
305. However, the court of appeals also 
writes that "both parties were uncertain as to 
the amount that remained owing on the origi-
nal contract when they entered Into their 
agreement" Id. This finding of uncertainty 
clearly ignores or overrides the trial court's 
finding that the parties were certain, though 
mistaken, that Horbach owed England $25,-
000, and the court of appeals' finding can 
therefore be upheld only if that court cor-
rectly decided that the trial court's finding of 
fact 11 was clearly erroneous. 
However, the court of Appeals never ex-
plicitly assigns error to the factual findings of 
the trial court, but claims to be "(alccepting 
the facts as found by the" trial court." Id 
Likewise, England does not argue that the 
trial court's finding of fact on this issue was 
clearly erroneous or even that the court of 
appeals found it to be clearly erroneous. In-
stead he argues that the court of appeals' 
ruling is consistent wi£h the fact9 as found by 
the trial court We disagree. If one accepts 
the trial court's finding that both parties 
believed $25,000 was owing on the original 
agreement, one cannot also accept the court 
of appeals' finding that the parties were un-
certain of the amount owed. Thus, while the 
court of appeals claims to be "[accepting the 
facts as found by the trial court," it has 
instead assumed facts contrary to those 
found by the trial court, implicitly rejecting 
the trial court's findings. The court of ap-
peals errs in reversing a trial court's finding 
of fact Unless such a finding is determined to 
be clearly erroneous Sevy, 902 P.2d at 635 
The court of appeals made no such determi-
nation, and England has not even argued, 
much less shown, clear error in the trial 
court's finding that Horbach executed the 
May 23 agreement under the belief that he 
owed England $25,000. We therefore con-
clude that the court of appeals erred insofar 
as it relied on the assumption that both 
parties were uncertain of the amount owed, 
and we explicitly adopt the trial court's find-
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ing that "at the May 28rd meeting both 
[England] and f Horbach] mistakenly believed 
that $25,000 remained owing under the 1989 
stock purchase agreement" 
II . WAS T H E MAY 23 AGREEMENT 
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION? 
[41 We must next determine whether, ac-
cepting the facts as found by the trial court, 
the court of appeals correctly found that the 
May 23 agreement constituted an "accord 
and satisfaction" agreement enforceable sep-
arately from the parties ' original 1989 agree-
m e n t According to the rule cited by the 
court of appeals, "[t]he elements of an accord 
and satisfaction lnchide[] '(I) a bona fide 
dispute \or uncertainty] over an unliquidated 
amount; (11) a payment tendered In full set-
tlement of the entire dispute; and (Hi) an 
acceptance of the payment ' " England, 905 
P.2d at 303 (change in original) (quoting Es-
tate Landscape <fc Snoiv Removal Specialists, 
Inc. v Mountain States Tel & Tel Co, 844 
P.2d 322, 325 (Utah 1992) (citing Morton 
Remodeling v Jensen> 706 P 2 d 607, 609 
(Utah 1985); Neiderkanter Bvildeti & Dcv 
Corp v Campbell, 824 P2d 1193, 1197 (Utah 
CtApp 1992))) In view of its finding that 
the parties were uncertatn of the amount 
owed under the original conbact, the ronri of 
appeals concluded that theu May 23 i^ree-
ment was the result of a compromise be-
tween England and Horbach—a new ngipo 
ment constituting an aocoid and satisfaction 
Id, at 304. 
The court of appeals then determined that 
while the parties were both under tho mis 
taken impression that money was still owed 
on the contract, this mistake went lo the 
terms of the original contract but did not 
affect the terms of the new and ^epoiate 
agreement—the accord and satisfaction—pn-
tered into by the parties on May 2?, 1991. 
Id\ at 305. The law of mutual mistake In this 
state declares, " 'A mutual mistake occurs 
when both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception about a basic assump-
tion or vital fact upon which they based their 
bargain. '" Warner v Sirstins, 838 P 2d 666, 
669 (Utah.Ct.App.1992) (quoting Robert 
Langston Ltd. v McQuarrie, 741 P 2d 554, 
557 (Utah.CtApp.1987)). The court of ap-
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peals writes, "In the instant case, the parties 
were mistaken as to facts relevant to the 
original contract—whether money was then 
due and owing—not as to a term underlying 
the accord and satisfaction." England, 905 
P 2d at 305 n 4 While a mutual mistake does 
Invalidate only the agreement entered into in 
reliance on the mistaken assumption, we do 
not decide the correctness of the court of 
appeals' legal conclusion that a mistake as to 
the amount owed does not go to the terms of 
an accord In satisfaction of that debt In-
stead, we conclude that the court of appeals 
misapplied this rule of law to the facts of the 
present case. 
Taking the facts as found by the trial 
court, there could have been no accord and 
satisfaction entered into on May 23, 1991, 
because the first element of accord and satis-
faction—the existence of a bona fide dispute 
or uncertainty over an unliquidated 
amount—was not present The trial court's 
finding that both parties believed Horbach 
owed England $25,000 precludes the possibil-
ity of a dispute over the amount owing and 
forces us to conclude that any uncertainty 
Horbach may have had was cleared up, be-
fore he signed the May 23 agreement, by 
England's own statement that Horbach owed 
him $25,000 Therefore, when Horbach exe-
cuted the agreement he was certain, though 
mistaken, of the amount he owed If there 
was no dispute and no uncertainty, there 
could have been no compromise and thus no 
accord Accepting the facts as found by the 
trial court, we must conclude that the May 23 
agreement represented merely the conclu-
sion of the parties' original contract, not a 
new accoid in satisfaction of an uncertain 
debt 
The court of appeals' ultimate conclusion 
that the parties' mistake went to the underly-
ing agreement, not to their May 23, 1991, 
accord and satisfaction, is based on a mis-
charactenVation of the trial court's findings 
of fact If we accept the facts as actually 
found by the trial court, there could have 
been no accord and satisfaction The parties 
agreed that Horbach would pay England 
$25,000 based on their mutual mistaken be-
lief that Horbach owed England $25,000, not 
as a compromise to satisfy an uncertain debt 
The trial court therefore correctly concluded 
that "the May 23rd agreement was made 
under a mutual mistake of fact which went to 
its essence and, therefore, the putative 
agreement is unenforceable " Horbach's ad-
ditional promise to give England two percent 
of the Medlcode stock must therefore be 
treated either aft a gratuitous promise unsup-
ported by consideration or, as Horbach sug-
gests, as a promise to hold the stock as 
security for payment on Horbach'B post-dat-
ed $25,000 check In either case, we may 
uphold the trial court's conclusion that "[a)ny 
•concession extracted from [Horbach] by 
[England] in the May 23rd alleged agree-
ment lacks consideration and the agreement, 
therefore, is unenforceable " 
On appeal, England does not argue that 
the trial court's factual finding was in error, 
only that the common mistake of the parties 
constitutes an "u n certainty" within the 
meaning of the rule of accord and satisfac-
tion. By blurring the distinction between 
mistake and uncertainty, England tries to 
make the trial court's facts fit within the 
court of appeals' theory of the case. A mis-
take, however, is clearly different from an 
uncertainty. In fact, one might argue that 
making a mistake requires some degree of 
certainty or at least some confidence that 
one's assumptions are correct. England's 
argument that the parties' mutual mistake 
should constitute an uncertainty within the 
rule of accord and satisfaction would effec-
tively eliminate the doctrine of mutual mis-
take from contract law because any mutual 
mistake could be called merely an uncertain-
ty Such a broad definition of "uncertainty 
is unwarranted by logic or precedent and 
would require courts to enforce contracts in 
ways that the parties could never foresee at 
the time of contracting and that might even 
be contrary to the intent of both parties. 
Because there was no dispute between the 
parties and no uncertainty in the parties' 
minds at the time of the May 23 agreement, 
that agreement cannot be characterized as an 
"accord and satisfaction" but merely as the 
conclusion of their original 1989 stock sales 
agreement. As such, the May 23 agreement 
was premised on a mutual mistake of materi-
al fact and is unenforceable The court of 
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appeals' decision to enforce that agreement 
must therefore be reversed. 
IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN 
ALLOWING HORBACH'S COUNTER-
CLAIM FOR OVERPAYMENTS? 
England argues finally that the trial Judge 
abused his discretion in allowing Horbach to 
amend his pleading to conform to the evi-
dence at trial, thereby permitting Horbach's 
counterclaim for overpayments Rule 15(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides: 
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the 
ground that it is not within the issues 
made by the pleadings, the court may al-
low the pleadings to be amended when the 
presentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice 
him in maintaining his action or defense 
upon the merits. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(b). 
[5] The decision to permit amendment 
under rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is subject to what we have called 
conditional discretionary review See Lange-
land v Monarch Motors, Inc, 307 Utah Adv 
Rep. 3, 4, P.2d , (Dec. 31, 1996) 
(applying conditional discretionary review to 
Utah R. Civ. P 36(b)). The trial court's 
discretion to grant amendment of the plead-
ings is conditioned on the satisfaction of two 
preliminary requirements: a finding that the 
presentation of the merits of the action will 
be subserved by amendment and a finding 
that the admission of such evidence would 
not prejudice the adverse party in maintain-
ing his action or defense on the merits. The 
trial court has only limited discretion in mak-
ing these preliminary findings, but once 
these prerequisites are met, the trial court 
has full discretion to allow an amendment of 
the pleadings; that is, it may grant or deny a 
party's motion for amendment upon any rea-
sonable basis, and the court's decision can be 
reversed only if abuse of discretion appears 
Cf. id. 
[6] In this case, England argues convinc-
ingly that be was prejudiced in maintaining 
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his defense against Horbach's counterclaim 
because of the lateness of the amendment 
In Langeland^ this court held that "the fac-
tors most important to our finding of preju-
dice include (I) the temporal proximity of 
the amendment to the date of trial, and (li) 
whether the party opposing amendment re-
lied on the [pleadings! in such a way as to 
detrimentally affect its ability to prepare its 
case." Langeland at 8, at In this 
case, Horbach first mentioned his counter 
claim in his trial memorandum and moved for 
permission to amend his pleadings at the end 
of the presentation of evidence. Prejudice 
might l?e found in the fact that England had 
no opportunity to prepare a response to the 
counterclaim and no time to brief and ni gue 
legal defenses such as waiver and estoppel, 
and also m the fact that England waived his 
right to a jury trial or rejected settlement 
offers in reliance on his understanding thai 
no countei claim would be pursued 
However, the rule requires the t m l fouri 
to consider prejudice only "[ilf evident o is 
objected to at the t r ia l" Utah R Civ F 
15(b). As his own brief states, "England 
acknowledges that no objection was rnisod at 
trial." Because England failed to object thp 
trial court had full discretion to grant 01 
deny Horbach's motion to amr»nd the pleid 
ings and can be reversed only upon a finding 
of abuse of discretion, that is, if "no 1 e n v i -
able basis" for the trial court's decision can 
be found. Considering the trial court's find 
ing that Horbach had overpaid England by 
$169,501 75, the court's decision to allow Hor 
bach's claim for that amount is reasonable 
and does not constitute an abuse of its dis-
cretion 
England suggests that the counterclitm 
for overpayments that Horbach introduced i t 
trial was intentionally kept hidden until the 
day of trial and that allowing Horbach to 
amend his pleadings at that late date will 
encourage other litigants to keep counter 
claims hidden until the eve of trial Howev 
er, the trial court's decision is not likely to 
have the precedential effect England fears 
First, any real advantage a party might gain 
by such surprise would constitute prejudice 
within the meaning of rule 15(b), and if ob-
jected to at trial, the court would not have 
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discretion to allow the amendment. See 
Utah R Civ P 16(b). Second, even In the 
absence of prejudice the trial court's decision 
to permit a rule 15(b) amendment is within 
the discretion of the trial court and any such 
"secret claims" would be lost if the trial 
judge found any reasonable basis for denying 
the motion 
Litigants are adequately discouraged from 
keeping their claims secret until the eve of 
trial by Hie fact that the trial judge has full 
discretion to deny late motions to amerld for 
any reason and the knowledge that most 
courts look on such motions with disfavor 
and are not easily persuaded to grant them 
Girard v Appleby, 660 P 2d 245, 248 (Utah 
1983) Even the most calculating litigants 
are unlikely to risk losing their claim merely 
In the hope of gaining some kind of advan-
tage through the element of surprise This 
is especially true when the potential advan-
tage to be gained could be eliminated by 
opposing counsel through an objection to the 
introduction of the evidence at trial and a 
showing that the amendment would prejudice 
them in the presentation of the merits of 
their action. The Rules of Civil Procedure 
are sufficient to discourage litigants from 
intentionally concealing counterclaims until 
the eve of trial. We are not willing to fur-
ther constrict the discretion of trial judges by 
second guessing their judgment every time 
an amendment to a party's pleadings is per-
mitted 
Because England failed to object to the 
presentation of evidence of Horbach's coun-
terclaim at trial, we conclude that the trial 
court was within its discretion to permit Hor-
bnch to amend his pleadings to conform to 
the evidence introduced at trial 
Taking the facts as the trial court found 
them, we conclude that the court of appeals 
erred in reversing the district court If on 
May 23, 1991, the parties were convinced 
that Horbach owed England $25,000, there 
could have" been no accord and satisfaction, 
because there was ho uncertainty or dispute 
about the amount owed Although the facts 
oh the record are somewhat ambiguous, Eng-
land does not urge us to reexamine the trial 
couit 's findings of fact but merely tries to 
make the trial court's facts fit within the 
court of appeals' theory of the case. This is 
an awkward fit at best and would require the 
court to define "uncertainty" so as to include 
"mistakes." This is not just a broad defini-
tion, it is a mlsdennitibn, and by conflating 
the two terms, the court would also conflate 
two doctrines, effectively subsuming the doc-
trine of mutual mistake within the theory of 
accord and satisfaction Such a change in 
the common law is not justified by logic or by 
equity, particularly considering that the re-
sult in this case would be to permit one party 
to retain what appears to be an unjust en-
richment of $169,501.75. 
The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the trial com t judgment rein-
stated. 
ZIMMERMAN, C J . , STEWART, 
Associate C J , and HOWE and RUSSON, 
JJ. , concur. 
O i WNUMBUSYSItM 
Shirley CARRIER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
PRO-TECH RESTORATION dba Stone 
Carpets, William Roger Smith, and The 
City of Pleasant Grove, Defendants and 
Peti t ioners. 
No. 960118. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug 8, 1997. 
Eastbound motorist who was injured In 
collision with southbound motorist brought 
negligence action against southbound motor-
ist, company that employed him at time of 
accident, and city. The Fourth District 
Court, Utah County, Ray M. Harding, Sr., J., 
entered judgment on jury verdict holding 
plaintiff 60 percent negligent, southbound 
motorist 40 percent negligent, and city not 
CARRIER v. P R O - T E C H RESTORATION 
CHe •» 944 T2d 346 (Ut*h 1997) 
Utah 34 
negligent to any extent Plaintiff appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, 909 P2d 271, Orme, 
T.J., reversed and remanded, holding that 
trial court granted excessive number of per-
emptory challenges to defendants. Granting 
certiorari, the Supreme Court, Zimmerman, 
C.J., held that: (1) trial court should have 
limited discretion in Its decisions with respect 
to whether coparties may exercise "separate 
sets of peremptory challenges; (2) there was 
no substantial controversy between south-
bound motorist and his former employer so 
as to warrant granting them separate sets of 
peremptory challenges; (3) rule that preju-
dice is presumed when trial court grants one 
side too many peremptory challenges re-
mains good law; (4) rule requiring that co-
parties jointly exercise peremptory chal-
lenges unless substantial controversy exists 
between tfiem does not deny those coparties' 
rights to due process or equal protection 
under Federal Constitution and does not vio-
late provision in State Constitution requiring 
uniform operation of lawB of a general na-
ture; and (5) plaintiff waived objection to the 
granting of separate set of peremptory chal-
lenges to city. 
Decision* of Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Russon, J., concurred in the result 
1. Certiorari ©»63.1 
On certiorari, Supreme Courts reviews 
decision of court of appeals, not of trial court 
2. Certiorari <&=»64(1) 
On certiorari, Supreme Court reviews 
court of appeals' decision for correctness and 
gives its conclusions of law no deference. 
3. Certiorari «»64(1) 
Correctness of court of appeals' decision, 
as determined by Supreme Court on certio-
rari review, depends initially upon whether it 
applied appropriate standard of review to 
trial court's decision. 
4. Jury «=» 136(3) 
In deciding whether coparties are enti-
tled to separate sets of peremptory chal-
lenges, the trial court must determine wheth-
er a substantial controversy exists between 
them; determination Is a mixed question of 
fact and law, requiring trial court first 
make fact findings as to the nature of ai 
controversy between coparties and then 
determine whether those facts meet leg 
standard of substantial contt overs y Rtil 
Civ.Proc, RU)P 47 
5. Appeal and E r r o r <s=»94f> 
Four factors should be considered 
determining the appropriate grant of discr 
tion to trial court in applying legal nil 
complexity and variety of facts undpriyir 
rule, extent of Supreme Court'* exponent 
applying legal principle and its ability I 
anticipate and articulate outeome-determin 
tive factors, extent to which trial judge h? 
observed facts relevant to application of th 
law that cannot be adequately reflected i 
record, and strength of any policy ronsidei 
ations supporting narrow discretion 
6. Ju ry <s=>136(3) 
Trial court should have limited dfarrt 
tion in its decisions with respect to whethe 
coparties may exercise separate sets of per 
emptory challenges; on spectrum of disere 
tion, running from de novo on the one hnn< 
to broad discretion on the other, appropriat 
discretion on this issue lies close to, althougl 
probably not at, the de novo end Rule 
Civ.Proc, Rule 47 
7. Ju ry <*=>136(3) 
Conflict between employer and formej 
employee, as to whether company advisee 
former employee to lie about collision involv 
ing employee and company van on othei 
driver did not constitute "Substantial contro 
versy" so as to warrant granting separate 
sets of peremptory challenges to employee 
and employer in negligence action by other 
driver; those defendants both asserted as 
defense that plaintiff was more responsible 
for causing accident than they, neither filed 
cross-claim against the other, and theie was 
no separate, related litigation between them 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 47. 
See publication Words and Phrase 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions 
8. J u r y <$=» 130(3) 
Fact that employer and former employ-
ee were represented by separate counsel in 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTME 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, and MP 
VENTURES, L.C. 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
PRINCIPLE FUNDING CORPORATION 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his capacity 
as Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO.010910255 
JUDGE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
This matter came before the above entitled court on plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction. Having considered both of the parties' arguments as well as the relevant law, the Court 
enters the following ruling granting plaintiffs motion. 
In 1995, Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure stated, in relevant part, that in 
the Court of Appeals, 
[t]he remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the expiration of 
the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari." 
The time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days from the entry of 
the Court of Appeals' decision. In this case, on October 19, 1995, the Court of Appeals issued a 
decision reversing and remanding the District Court's Order. Then, on November 22, 1995, more 
than thirty days later, the Court of Appeals remitted the case back to the District Court. Shortly 
thereafter, on November 24, 1995, defendant filed a petition for certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Based upon this sequence of events, defendant contends that after remittitur the District Court 
did not obtain proper jurisdiction and consequently could modify its judgment in accordance with 
the instructions of the Court of Appeals. However, defendant's petition for certiorari was only 
granted after the Court of Appeals sent the case back to the District Court and after the thirty day 
waiting period had expired. Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, it was defendant who was in 
a better position to protect itself in this matter since defendant could have requested a stay of 
execution of judgment pending its petition. 
Thus, for purposes of priority, the relevant judgment's priority is to be determined from the 
date of reinstatement and does n d relate back to the original judgment. Cox Corp. v Vertin 754 P.2d 
938 (Utah 1988) 
This is the final Order of this Court, no further Order is necessary. 
Dated this & day of December, 2001. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010910255 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail STEVEN W CALL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
79 SOUTH MAIN 
P.O. BOX 4 5385 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 841450385 
Mail RONALD G RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY PLA 
185 SOUTH STATE STE 1300 
PO BOX 11019 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841470019 
Dated this _/VJ day of / V x i ^ 20 >££. 
Page 1 (last) 
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Ronald C. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
Jeffrey D. Stevens, Esq. (8496) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 3 1 2002 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By. ctuinth 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP 
VENTURES, L.C., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 010910255PR 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
This matter came before the court for oral argument on December 3, 2001 on 
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Ronald G. Russell appeared on behalf of 
plaintiffs and Steven W. Call appeared on behalf of defendant Principal Funding 
Corporation. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties submitted the matter to 
the court for a final determination based on the facts established by the record. The 
court took the matter under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision dated 
December 10, 2001. Based on the record herein, the matters submitted, and the 
arguments of counsel, the court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff MP Ventures, L.C. is the owner of certain real property located at 
2157 South Lincoln Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, which is more particularly described as 
follows: 
Lots 1 through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, 
according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at 
Page 90 of the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. 
Said property is hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property." 
2. On or about April 18, 1994, a Judgment on a counterclaim was entered 
against Lan C. England in the Third judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in 
an action entitled Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV 
(the "Horbach judgment"). 
3. An appeal was taken from the Horbach Judgment and on October 19, 1995, 
the Utah Court of Appeals filed an Opinion reversing the Horbach Judgment which 
states, "we vacate the trial court's judgment based upon defendant's counterclaim. . . ." 
England v. Horbach, 905 P.2d 301, 303 n.1 (Utah App. 1995). The Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its Remittitur to the district court on November 22, 1995, which 
2 
Remittitur was docketed by the district court in Civil No. 930901471 CV on December 1, 
1995. 
4. On November 20, 1995, a petition for a writ of certiorari was filed with the 
Utah Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
petition for a writ of certiorari is shown as Entry No. 1 on the Utah Supreme Court's 
docket in case number 950506. 
5. On February 13, 1996, the Utah Supreme Court entered an order granting 
the petition for a writ of certiorari and, by letter dated February 14, 1996 addressed tu 
the Third Judicial District Court, requested that the district court prepare and transmit the 
record to the Utah Supreme Court. 
6. On May 30, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court issued an opinion on the 
certiorari petition. That decision states, "The judgment of the court of appeals is 
reversed, and the trial court judgment reinstated." England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 
346 (Utah 1997). 
7. The Utah Supreme Court issued its Remittitur in case number 950506 on 
October 1, 1997. 
8. While the petition for certiorari was pending, Lan England borrowed 
$500,000 from Option One Mortgage Corporation secured by a Deed of Trust recorded 
against the Subject Property on May 31 , 1996 as Entry No. 6371918, in Book 7412, at 
Page 2835 of the official records of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder having Lan C. 
3 
England, as trustor, First American Title of Utah, as trustee, and Option One Mortgage 
Corporation, as beneficiary (the "Option One Trust Deed"). 
9. The Option One Trust Deed was foreclosed and on January 10, 2001, a 
Trustee's Deed was recorded at the office of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder as 
Entry No. 7797085, in Book 8414, at Page 8416 naming Chase Manhattan Bank as 
grantee. 
10. Chase Manhattan Bank conveyed the Subject Property to Tim Linford. In 
turn, Tim Linford conveyed the Subject Property to MP Ventures, L.C. 
11. Principal Funding Corporation is the assignee of the Horbach Judgment and 
directed the Salt Lake County Sheriff to conduct a sheriff's execution sale of the Subject 
Property. 
12. Plaintiffs brought this action seeking an order and decree from the court 
declaring and decreeing that defendant Principal Funding Corporation does not hold a 
judgment lien against the Subject Property and seeking to enjoin the sheriff's sale. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
13. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-22-1(2), a judgment lien applies to the 
judgment debtor's property "owned or acquired during the existence of the 
4 
judgment . . . ." The lien does not exist independently of the judgment and attaches to 
the debtor's property only so long as the judgment exists. 
14. Because the judgment lien depends on the existence of the judgment, the 
lien of the Horbach judgment ceased to exist when the judgment was vacated by the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
15. When the Utah Supreme Court later reinstated the Horbach Judgment, a 
judgment lien once again arose, but the relevant judgment's priority is to be determined 
from the date of reinstatement and oues not relate back to the original judgment. See 
Cox Corp. v. Vertin, 754 P.2d 938 (Utah 1988). 
16. Defendant Principal Funding Corporation contends that after Remittitur from 
the Utah Court of Appeals, the district court did not obtain jurisdiction and consequently 
could not modify its judgment in accordance with the instructions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The version of Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in effect in 1985, 
however, provided that "the remittitur of the court shall issue immediately after the 
expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari." The time for filing a 
petition for writ of certiorari was, and remains, thirty days from the entry of the Utah 
Court of Appeals' decision. The Utah Court of Appeals properly issued its Remittitur 
within thirty days after the entry of its decision. 
17. The filing of the petition for a writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme 
Court did not automatically stay the effect of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision or the 
5 
Remittitur issued by the Utah Court of Appeals. A stay of the Remittitur pending 
certiorari review could have been sought to stay the effect of the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision and maintain a judgment lien. See Utah R. App. P. 36(b); State v. Palmer. 802 
P.2d 748 (Utah App. 1990). Because a stay was available upon posting a supersedeas 
bond, as a matter of public policy, the rationale adopted by courts in other jurisdictions 
holding that a reinstated judgment takes priority as of the date of reinstatement should 
also apply in Utah. 
18. Plaintiff are entitled to the entry of judgment as prayed in the Amended 
Complaint, including a decree quieting title to the Subject Property and enjoining 
defendants from causing an execution sale of the Subject Property. 
DATED this ^f [ day of January, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS T(p F( 
Honorable Stephen L. Henrio< 
District Court Judge 
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Ronald Gl Russell, EsqNof 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Steven W. Call, Esq. of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK; and MP 
VENTURES, L.C., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRINCIPAL FUNDING CORPORATION; 
and AARON D. KENNARD, in his 
capacity as Salt Lake County Sheriff, 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010910255PR 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
The court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based 
thereon and the record in this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on 
Count I of the Amended Complaint. The court hereby declares that defendant Principal 
0 0 
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Funding Corporation does not hold a judgment lien against the following-described 
property (the "Subject Property") arising from the Judgment entered in the action entitled 
Lan C. England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No. 930901471CV, in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah and the court hereby quiets title to the Subject 
Property in favor of plaintiff MP Ventures, L.C. and against defendant Principal Funding 
Corporation. The Subject Property is located in Salt Lake County, Utah and is more 
specifically described as follows: 
Lots i through 8, inclusive, of Block 3, Geneva Place, according 
to the official plat thereof, filed in Book C of Plats, at Page 90 of 
the official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
(Tax identification number 16-20-136-006.) 
2. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation on Count II of the Amended Complaint and defendant Principal 
Funding Corporation is hereby enjoined and restrained from causing the Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County to sell, attempt to sell, or to initiate any further proceedings to sell the 
Subject Property pursuant to execution proceedings arising from a Judgment entered in 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah in an action entitled Lan C. 
England v. Eugene Horbach, et al., Civil No.930901471CV. 
3. Bond number 1162810 filed in this action by Old Republic Surety Company, 
CO 
as surety, dated November 26, 2001, is hereby released and discharged. OO 
cn 
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4. This judgment is a final order resolving all claims and causes of action in this 
case and is, therefore, entered as the Final Judgment. 
DATED this & / day of January, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Stephen L. Henriod 
District Court Judge 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Steven W. Call, Esq. oi 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant Principal Funding Corporation 
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